Lalit's Views: 2004

India’s China War by Neville Maxwell

Historical
Introduction: the Limits of Empries

(i)
The Western Sector

(ii)
The McMahon Line

Part
I: Collision Course

(i)
The Course is Set

(ii)
Evasive Action

Part
II: The Forward Policy

Part
III: The View from Peking

Part
IV: The Border War

(i)
The Ridge and the River

(ii) Between
Two Passes

Part V: Ceasefire

Map:
the disputed boundaries and Aksai Chin area

Historical
Introduction: the Limits of Empires

(i)
The Western Sector

The disputed territories between China and India are located at a
no-man’s land, where nothing grows and no one lives, on high altitude Himalayas,
one of the most barren regions of the world. For centuries, the Himalayas
was the focal point of military and political maneuvers between the three
empires, the Russians in the north, the British on the subcontinent and
the Chinese over the other side of the Himalayas. A constant and basic
British aim was to keep the Russians as far as possible from the plains
of India. The British and Russians made Afghanistan to play as buffer between
them to avoid collision, but their attempts to make China as a buffer failed
as the Chinese refused to cooperate. In 1846, after the British took Kashmir
and set it up as the northern frontier, they tried to demarcate a boundary
with Tibet at Ladakh, which lay in the valley of the upper Indus at an
altitude of twelve thousand feet or more. It had been part of Tibet up
to the tenth century, when it became an independent kingdom. In the sixteenth
century, it became a tributary state of the Mongol Empire, and in the nineteen
century, it was regarded as part of Tibet again. In 1846, since neither
the Chinese nor Tibetans cooperated with Britain, no demarcation of the
Tibet-Ladakh boundary took place. In 1846 and 1847, the British commissioners
drew boundaries in north of the Pangong Lake and stopped at the Karakoram
Pass but could not correctly define the northwest boundaries of Tibet.
Aksai Chin, which became the heart of contention between India and China
a century later, lay between the Lake and the Pass. At 17,000 feet elevation,
the desolation of Aksai Chin had no human importance other than an ancient
trade route that crossed over it, providing a brief pass during summer
for caravans of yaks from Sinkiang to Tibet that carried silk, jade, hemp,
salt or wool.

By the 1860s, the Russians forced China to sign the treaties of Aigun
and Peking. China lost a great tract of territory in Central Asia to Russia,
which took all the north of the Amur River and east of its tributary, cutting
off China from the Sea of Japan. China decided not to negotiate boundary
settlements from a weak position, and persisted with this approach until
the middle of the 1950s. In early 1880s, China and India agreed the Karakoram
Pass as the fixed point of boundary, while leaving both sides of the pass
indefinite. In the mid-1890s, China claimed Aksai Chin as its territory,
and voiced the claim to Macartney in 1896, who drew part of the British
boundary in the Himalayas. Macartney presented the claim to the British
who agreed with his comment that part of Aksai Chin was in China and part
in the British territory. Meanwhile, the forward school of British strategist
in London suggested that the British should not only include the whole
of Aksai Chin, but also all the territory given to Kashmir in 1865. In
1899, however, the British proposed a boundary demarcation with the Macartney-MacDonald
line, which gave China the whole of the Karakash Valley, and almost all
of Aksai Chin proper while pushing the British boundary forward on the
Karakoram range, but China never replied to the proposal. By the first
decade of the twentieth century, the British adhered to the 1899 proposal
and aimed at making Aksai Chin as part of Tibet, rather than Sinkiang.
In 1911, the collapse of the Chinese power in central Asia prompted the
British to revise its objective of keeping Russia away from the plains
of India. The British had long expected the Russian annexation of Sinkiang.
The forward school of strategist recommended to place Aksai Chin outside
Russia but within British territory. The London Government ignored the
recommendation, and held to the 1899 proposal and in the Simla Convention
in 1914 still placed Aksai Chin as part of Tibet. Up until the end of British
rule, Britain had never attempted to exert authority on Aksai Chin or establish
posts in it.

For the first decade of the twentieth century, Britain attempted to
establish exclusive influence over Tibet. When the British first arrived,
Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan were all in various degrees of dependence upon
or allegiance to China. Nepal was created by a Hindu hill-people invading
Tibet in the eighteen century. In 1792, the Chinese troops defeated their
invasion of Tibet and left Nepal a tributary of China. Lhasa took Sikkim
as a Tibetan dependency, and periodically asserted suzerainty over Bhutan.
The British considered the Tibetan, and indirectly the Chinese, dominance
as a challenge to its rule. In the nineteenth century, Britain achieved
the reversal of the allegiance of the Himalayan states by converting Nepal,
Sikkim, and Bhutan as a chain of protectorates. With that, the British
were content comfortably with their boundary beneath the Himalayan foothills.

(ii)
The McMahon Line

To the east of Bhutan lay another no-man’s land, demarcating the boundary
and presented as both worry and temptation for the British India. In 1873,
the British drew a line at the foothills called "Inner Line" to protect
the zone beneath the hills. The international boundary comprised of the
Outer Line, which ran along the southern border of Bhutan and the foothills
leading to the Tibetan tableland. Around the British territory in the northwest,
Tawang was the only salient wedge of territory, administered through the
great monastery of Tawang in the north and populated by Buddhist tribes
deeply influenced the Tibetan culture. In 1907, Britain entered into an
agreement with Russia in an Anglo-Russian Convention and set up Tibet as
a buffer state, like Afghanistan. The British viewed China as a passive
or almost neutral element in its diplomacy. But in the first decade of
the twentieth century, as the Manchu dynasty ended, Chinese policy changed
sharply in Tibet. Military presence was extended through central Tibet,
and more modern institutions replaced the theocratic and ancient machinery
of administration, which reducing the role of the Dalai Lama and the power
of the monastic orders. By 1910, China had established effective power
in Tibet, and the buffer for India to keep Russia away was lost, as the
Morning Post in London wrote: "A great Empire, the future military strength
of which no man can foresee, has suddenly appeared on the North-East Frontier
of India." The British was concerned that China would pose a strategic
threat to India, and the forward school recommended more active patrolling
in the hills beyond the frontier. It was decided that if China attacked
India, Britain would attack China from the sea. The Chief of the General
Staff warned of the dangerous pressure through Tawang Tract, and recommended
bringing not only Tawang but also a sizeable slice of Tibet into India.
From 1911, the Indian government embarked on a deliberate advance of the
northeastern boundary. In order not to invite a vigorous Chinese protest,
the Indian military made secrete expeditions into the Tibetan tribal belts
of Assam which British took for India twenty years ago, bypassing the Parliament’s
permission. Although it was outside of the external frontiers, the official
British maps showed it as part of the frontier. The officials fobbed that
"it is not intended to increase the area administered by" the Indian government.
The statement was literally true since the Inner Line was not changed,
but it was the Outer Line that was advanced.

In 1911-12, the Chinese power in Tibet suddenly collapsed. The British
decided that it was in their strategic and political interest to exclude
effective Chinese power from Tibet. In 1913, British convoked a conference
at Simla which was aimed at making Tibet a buffer state between Britain
and China, like the buffer effect to keep the Russians away. McMahon, the
Foreign Secretary of the Indian government, led the British delegation
to attend the Simla Conference. The British made open effort to make China
accept a division of Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet, as the agreement
made by China and Russia in the case of Mongolia. China would have suzerainty
over the whole of Tibet, but would have no administrative rights in Outer
Tibet, thereby keeping back from the borders of India. The coercive diplomatic
methods of Britain brought the weak and unwilling China to the conference.
The Chinese representatives stressed the paramount importance of Tibet
and resisted its zonal division, keenly aware of the British effort to
separate Tibet or at least a great part of it from China. In April 1914,
McMahon induced the Chinese official, Ivan Chen, to initiate a draft treaty,
but the Chinese government repudiated the unauthorized compliance immediately.
McMahon presented the draft to the British, which plainly cancelled its
validity. In July, the conference was closed without Chinese signing the
convention. London had instructed McMahon all along not to sign bilaterally
with Tibetans if China refused, but McMahon proceeded to sign with the
Tibetan representative while Ivan Chen was sent to the next room. Chen
was not told of what was being signed and the declaration was kept as secret
for many years. Although all this provided much fertile ground for international
lawyers, the results of the conference were clear, and was accepted as
such by the British Government at the time: the Simla Conference produced
no agreement to which the government of China was a party. McMahon admitted
this himself: "It is with great regret that I leave India without have
secured the formal adherence of the Chinese Government to a Tripartite
Agreement." China had emphatically and repeatedly denied that Tibet enjoyed
sovereign identity and that China would not recognize any bilateral agreement
between Tibet and Britain.

A covert byproduct of the Simla Conference was the McMahon Line. It
came as a result of the secret discussions, without the Chinese participation
or knowledge, which took place in Delhi between the British and the Tibetans
in February and March of 1914. These meetings breached not only the Anglo-Chinese
Convention of 1906, in which Britain was to "engage not to annex Tibetan
territory," but also of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in which
Britain was to engage "not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except
through the intermediary of the Chinese Government." The British moved
the line progressively to the north of Tawang, which was still short of
the goal proposed by the Chief of the General Staff to annex some two thousand
square miles of Tibetan territory. McMahon Line essentially pushed the
boundary northward about sixty miles, and moved it from the foothills to
the crest line of the Assam Himalayas. In doing so, McMahon accomplished
for British India what other officials attempted twenty years ago on the
Afghan frontier, and brought the tribal no-man land under nominal British
sovereignty. China forcefully repudiated the convention and denied the
validity of the map, and the Tibetans in practice ignored the Line. In
1919, the British tried once more to induce China to resume the tripartite
negotiations. After China refused, the British began providing military
aid to Tibetans, including arms, ammunitions, and training in their use.
When the British relinquished the Indian Empire in 1947, they started to
translate the McMahon Line from the maps as the effective northwest boundary
of India, despite that the Line appeared on its maps only ten years before.
As the British departed, the new Indian government assured that they would
complete their work: "If anything, they intended to pursue an even more
forward policy than had the British."

Part
I: Collision Course

(i)
The Course is Set

With their independence on August 14, 1947, the status of the boundaries
of India changed from the pawns for the British to play with their imperial
rivals, to become the cell walls of a new national identity. The Indian
government followed closely the footsteps of the British colonists. In
1949, India sent troops during an uprising in Sikkim and brought the state
as a protectorate. In the same year, India signed a treaty to take over
Britain’s rights to guide Bhutan in foreign affairs. In 1950, India increased
its control over Nepal and consolidated the "chain of protectorates" in
the Himalayan states. Towards Tibet, the new Indian Government followed
the British mission in encouraging Tibetan separatism. In its strategic
and geopolitical thinking inherited from the British, the Indian Government
continued the exclusion of China’s authority from Tibet and attempted to
increase the Indian influence. The Tibetans hoped that the transfer of
British power to the Indians would give them an opportunity to regain the
territory that British took from them a century before. In October 1947,
they formally requested India to return their territory from Ladakh to
Assam, and including Sikkim. The Indians in return simply asked Tibet to
continue the relationship on the basis of the previous British Government.

The Indian plan to continue with British policy was met with major challenges.
The absence of the British power and emergence of a strong central authority
with the establishment of the Communist China reversed the power balance.
With the announcement of Chinese military marching into Tibet, India reacted
sharply and threatened that it would support the position of the Nationalist
rump on Formosa rather than the People’s Republic of China in the United
Nations. A few days later, Chinese army entered Tibet, and Indian government
headed by the Prime Minister Nehru issued an angry protest, deploring the
"invasion" of Tibet. China replied sharply: "Tibet is an integral part
of China, and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China,"
and warned that it would not tolerate foreign interference. In response
to India’s avowal that the use of military would injure China’s reputation
in the world, China stated that any governments that interfere with China’s
sovereign rights in Tibet as a pretext to obstruct China’s membership in
the UN would further demonstrate their hostility. Indian government changed
the China’s "sovereignty" to "suzerainty" over Tibet and hoped that China
would leave domestic affairs to Tibetans like what Indians did in Bhutan.
China viewed the Indian desire to have semi-independence in Tibet as a
preliminary attempt to draw Tibet under Indian influence, an inference
neither far-fetched nor unfair. When China later established diplomatic
relations with Nepal, China became an open competitor in what India regarded
as diplomatic reserve. In 1950, after its failed attempt to have some degrees
of Tibetan independence and buffer, the Indian government adopted a pragmatic
policy of pursuing friendship with China, a central element in India’s
foreign policy formulated by Nehru. As China confirmed its authority in
Tibet, India did not support the appeal of Tibet to the UN.

The presence of Chinese power in the northern borders alarmed the political
rights in India, who feared the Communist China the most. The Opposition
criticized the Tibet policy of Nehru and the Government, and accused them
of complacency and vacillation. Fundamental reappraisal of China policy
was proposed, and India was to deploy forces to guard potentially disputed
areas. While maintaining the policy of friendship to China and advocating
on behalf of China in the United Nations, Nehru ordered Indian administration
to extend at the tribal belt beneath the McMahon Line through the North-East
Frontier Agency. In a year, twenty posts were extended into NEFA, and several
hundreds porters and escorts moved into Tawang without challenging the
Tibetan administration there. The Indian government decided not to modify
McMahon Line and push their boundary up from Se La to the McMahon Line.
In response to the protests of the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa, the Indian
officials stated that India was taking over Tawang. The Tibetans protested
again that they "deeply regret and absolutely cannot accept’ what the Indian
government "seizing as its own what did not belong to it." The Indian government
ignored the protests, forced the Tibetan administration out, and stayed
on in Tawang, as the British did in Dirang Dzong in 1944. With this, the
Indian government overcame the "dangerous wedge" of Tibetan/Chinese territory
that so concerned the British General Staff. Having their verbal resistance
ignored, the Tibetans took a toll in blood the Indian extension. One of
the Tibetan tribes warmly welcomed a strong patrol comprising seventy-four
riflemen and civilians from Assam. The Tibetans feasted and gave them shelter,
and then massacred all but one. Nehru ordered an overwhelming show of force,
rather than burning the villages or imprisoning the Tibetans as would have
done by the British. The McMahon Line was formally transported from the
maps to the ground, and was set as the de facto northeast boundary of India.
To deal with China about the repudiated McMahon Line, the British provided
part of the solution, that India would simply treat McMahon Line as the
boundary and leave it to China to protest. Indian Government decided to
push the boundary settlement from diplomacy to an absolutist approach,
that "India would refuse to open the question to negotiation when or if
the Chinese did raise it." In November 1950, the Government unilaterally
declared the McMahon Line as their boundary, "map or no map… we will not
allow anybody to come across that boundary," as Nehru declared.

In September 1951, the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai, proposed
to the Indian ambassador to stabilize the Tibetan frontier through discussions
between India, China and Nepal, confirming that China had decided to accept
the McMahon Line as India’s northwest boundary. But India passed the opportunity
to formalize the McMahon Line. In July 1952, when China proposed to settle
"pending problems" related to commercial intercourse and trade in Tibet,
the boundary question was not raised. There was doubt in India about the
decision not to raise the boundary questions with China. But it was decided
that McMahon Line might be the "scars left by Britain in the course of
her aggression against China" and that to "seek to heal or ease this scar"
was not in the liking or interest of India. The Indian government was fully
aware that China, "never having accepted … as the frontier between Tibet
and us," would not regard the McMahon Line as the settled boundary. They
decided to treat the Line as the boundary and leave it for China to either
agree or ignore the statement. In 1954, when the Indian delegation went
to negotiate trade and intercourse in Tibet, they even went out of their
way to avoid the subject. The agreement stated the famous "Five Principles
of Peaceful Co-existence," or "Panch Sheel" as Indians called them, the
first of which was "mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity
and sovereignty." China’s sovereignty in Tibet was unequivocally recognized,
and the British attempts and latter Indian attempts to treat Tibet as independent
were formally buried. India formed a crucial China policy that India would
make clear and treat what India regarded as proper boundary, leaving it
to China to protest, and then "refuse to reopen the question." Based on
the first principal of the Panch Sheel, China would have not choice but
to accept the boundary. It was understood, based on Chinese acquiescence
in the 1951 Indian takeover of Tawang, that China was going to accept the
McMahon Line. The decision not to renegotiate transformed a boundary problem
into a dispute, which then progressed into a border war. China maintained
that parts of the boundaries were undetermined and to be negotiated. Indians
held that the boundaries were already determined and decided to establish
checkposts all along them.

In 1954, the official Indian map made sharp changes in the northern
boundaries. The British earlier made Aksai Chin a strategic area to keep
Russian advance from India, but never proposed it as a boundary and reflected
in the extension of administration, which was far beyond the British capacity.
However, India categorically claimed Aksai Chin as part of the northern
border and Nehru ruled it as "a firm and definite one which was not open
to discussion with anybody." Thus far, the claim remained on the official
map change and not reflected on the ground. The Indian posts were set in
Ladakh, far short of Aksai Chin. In September 1954, it was decided that
border posts should be advanced as far as possible into the disputed areas.
The forward move into the middle sector brought prompt Chinese protests
that Indian troops had intruded into Chinese territory and violated the
principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence. The Indian government
responded that the territory belonged to India and asked China to keep
the personnel out. The Tibetans had so far controlled the middle sectors
of the boundary passes, and an annual race occurred to get to the high
point before the other side. The Indian government accused China of aggression,
while in fact the two border forces came into contact as a result of the
forward move made by the Indians, a fact that Nehru confirmed to the Parliament
years later. The reversed accusation by India, that it was China who "probe
forward," took place before the ink was dry on the Panch Sheel agreement
and was universally believed.

Aksai Chin was easily accessible from the Chinese side as an ancient
trade route wedging from Sinkiang across the plateau to Tibet. It was more
difficult for the Indians to reach, as it led to nowhere for them. Through
the first half of the 1950s, China used the Aksai Chin route to supply
western Tibet and built a total length of seven hundred and fifty miles
of road, of which one hundred and twelve crossed the territory claimed
by India. By 1958, on the east, the Indians completed the unfinished work
left by the British in claiming the McMahon Line as boundary and asserting
administration over the tribal territory from Tawang, which was renamed
as North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) listed as Indian territory. On the
west, the road built across Aksai Chin had become the main traffic artery
between Sinkiang and Tibet. The two sides left each other alone, and the
boundary problem went faraway from resolving itself.

From 1950 on, Nehru had no peers in the Indian government and acted
as the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and took on the presidency of
the Congress Party, and retained the portfolio of External Affairs until
his death in 1964. Nehru often made crucial foreign policy decisions without
the awareness of the committees or the Cabinet. One Finance Minister resigned
in 1956 after complaining Nehru’s "cavalier and unconstitutional" methods.
Nehru visited China in 1939 and again in 1954, and was much impressed by
the "terrifying strength," the energy and discipline that the Chinese demonstrated
in their nation building. The domestic oppositions attacked Nehru for his
China policy as appeasement. But in the middle 1950s, the resentment at
the assertion of Chinese authority in Tibet died down and was replaced
with the popular policy of Hindee Chinee bhai-bhai, or India-China
brotherhood. In 1956, Chou En-lai returned Nehru’s visit and was cheered
by large crowds. Chou raised the subjects of the McMahon Line. Nehru warned
Chou that the Burmese were displeased about the two big neighbors and suggested
China to take steps to remove Burma’s misgivings. Chou told Nehru that
China had accepted the McMahon Line, albeit established by the British
imperialists as unfair, as the boundary with Burma because of the friendly
relations between China, India and other countries concerned. Chou reaffirmed
that the Chinese Government approached the alignment established by former
imperialist neighbors as effective boundary, including the Sino-Russian
boundary on the Ussuri and Amur Rivers. The Indians made the McMahon Line
as the de facto boundary only five years ago, but China treated the "accomplished
fact" as effective boundary. This was the only practical way for China
to go on without creating intractable and poisonous disputes with every
neighbor. However, China would not simply confirm the McMahon Line that
had no treaty basis, but was prepared to accept the alignment in negotiation
with India.

In October 1958, after discovering the Aksai Chin road, the Indian Government
claimed that the territory had been "part of the Ladakh region of India
for centuries." India expressed "surprise and regret" to Peking that the
Chinese government constructed "a road through indisputably Indian territory
without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India." The
note further inquired of a missing Indian patrol. China counter complained
that an Indian armed personnel was detained for having intruded into Chinese
territory, and asked India to comply with the five principles of peaceful
co-existence. With conflict of claims over Aksai China came into open,
the Indian Government replied that it was "a matter in dispute," the only
time it conceded of the disputed nature of the area before reversing its
position in a few weeks. Chinese maps continued to show the Sino-Indian
border along the foothills and had the whole of Aksai Chin in China. China
expected to discuss the boundary before confirming the alignment. But New
Delhi suspected the rational approach as an alarm that China was to advance
territorial claims, and the distrust soon became resentful hostility. In
December 1958, Nehru wrote Chou En-lai a friendly letter expressing that
India had been "under the impression that there were no border disputes"
during Chou’s visit in 1956. Chou En-lai replied with equal affability
stating that "the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited"
and that "historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary
has ever been concluded" between the Chinese and Indians Governments. Chou
En-lai stated that there were border disputes and suggested settling by
mutual consultation and joint survey. As Nehru was categorical about the
entire boundary, Chou was categorical about Aksai Chin as it "has always
been under Chinese jurisdiction" and that the Chinese guards have continually
patrolled it. Chou further raised the illegality of the McMahon Line as
the product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibetan Region
of China, but stated that, in light of the friendly relations China had
with India and Burma, China would accept the McMahon alignment as the boundary.
Chou En-lai proposed the maintenance of the status quo before the boundary
was formally settled. Nehru rejected Chou’s proposal and suggested China
to evacuate from Aksai Chin and made it an absolute precondition for discussion
of the borders. The Indian Government did not take as adamant position
as in negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir.

In 1959, the Tibetan armed uprising failed in Lhasa and the Dalai Lama
fled through the old trade route across the McMahon Line to Tawang, where
Indian Government took him under the wing. The Dalai Lama later made an
issue of the legality of the McMahon Line, suggesting that if India denied
the sovereign status to Tibet, it was also denying the validity of the
Simla Convention and the validity of the McMahon Line. There was general
sympathy for Tibetans, especially the Dalai Lama in the Indian political
class. The latent suspicion of China was revived and the diffidence over
China’s takeover of Tibet in 1950 sharpened. Peking complained that Kalimpong
(the terminus of the trade route to India through the Chumbi Valley), which
China declared as the commanding center for the armed rebelling, was a
nest of spies and was used as a base to instigate resistance against China.
Aside from the activities of émigrés and American and Kuomintang
agents, there was evidence that the Indians played a more active role for
Tibetan independence. The Chinese National People’s Congress made angry
references to the "Indian reactionaries" for giving aid and comfort to
the rebellious feudal forces, working "in the footsteps of the British
imperialists, and harboring expansionist ambitions towards Tibet." The
old suspicions were thus revived on both sides.

Like Nehru, the Chinese Government recognized that good relations were
in its best long-term interests, and the Chinese Ambassador conveyed the
concern to the Indian Foreign Secretary: "China will not be so foolish
as to antagonize the United States in the east and again to antagonize
India in the west." The Ambassador stated that the outcry of Tibetan rebellion
in India overcastted dark clouds over Sino-Indian relations and that it
would "speedily disperse." The statements expressed urgency and directness,
but were undiplomatic. A week later, the Chinese Ambassador was called
to the Ministry and was rebuked for having used "discourteous and unbecoming
language." He was told that India treated all countries as friends "in
consonance with India’s past background and culture and Mahatma Gandhi’s
teachings." The diplomatic exchange was coupled with stronger presence
of Chinese troops on the McMahon Line to prevent the Tibetan rebels from
crossing. On the other side, the Indians also pushed their outposts right
up to and over the McMahon Line. The McMahon Line was never demarcated,
i.e., marked out on the ground and agreed by both parties, but it followed
an unmistakable and inaccessible crest-line. A demarcation must be a joint
process, but Indians were unilaterally establishing border posts according
to their maps without seeking China’s approval. In September 1959, Nehru
rejected Chou En-lai’s letter in which China complained that the Indians
were overstepping the McMahon Line. But Nehru admitted that there was "slight"
difference in the Migyitun area with the map, which he justified as modifications
"based on definitive topography" in accordance with "established international
principles." India insisted that China not only should first formally recognize
the McMahon Line, but also should accept the boundary India claimed in
the western sector. China protested the Indian forward moves and complained
that on August 25, Indian troops intruded south of the Migyitun and fired
on Chinese. New Delhi protested the next day that China moved into Indian
territory and forced Indians out of Longju, accusing China of "deliberate
aggression" and warning that it would "use force on the trespasser if necessary,"
a bluff threat that was not founded in international law.

China’s account of the Longju incident was contrary to India’s. China
maintained that the Chinese border guards merely returned fire at the unprovoked
attack by the Indians. The Indian claims were militated by the fact that
China did not attack the other Indian posts set up along McMahon Line.
However, in India, there was no doubt that the incident was Chinese aggression.
The Chinese were denounced for the "expansionism" and the "cynical contempt"
to treat the "noble concepts of friendship, toleration and co-existence."
Meanwhile, another collision broke out on the western sector of the McMahon
Line. The Indian troops went to establish posts on Lanak Pass, which India
regarded as the boundary feature. The patrol of about seventy men came
into contact with the Chinese at the Kongka Pass, which China regarded
as the boundary feature and had established a post. On October 20, three
Indians were detained by the Chinese; next day nine Indian forces were
killed and seven taken prisoner. Chinese suffered casualties, with probably
only one killed. The Indians reported to have been ambushed from a hilltop,
whereas the Chinese said that the Indians attempted to capture the small
Chinese patrol and opened fire. The captured Indians, including the patrol
commander, confirmed the Chinese accounts, but after release retracted
their statements. However, there was no doubt in India, as the newspaper
called "the brutal massacre of an Indian policy party."

In the three following years after the Longju and Kongka pass clashed,
the Parliament spent hundreds of hours on the dispute with China. Nehru
enjoyed his dominance in the House, which accepted his arrogant authority,
but he was also submerged with powerful opposition from the Congress Party.
The Defense Minister Menon often became a scapegoat target for the critics
of Nehru. In August 1959, the "bluster against China" picked up volume
and the opposition criticisms attacked the government’s China policy over
the boarder dispute. The opposition was not deep and was formed primarily
by small upper-class group, whose views were regarded as "public opinion"
and expressed in newspapers, especially the English newspapers. The newspapers
reported of the Chinese troops crossing the McMahon Line and suggested
of Indian government to aid Bhutan, of which Prime Minister promptly declared
that Bhutan was not an Indian protectorate. But up to the end of August
1959, Nehru had told Parliament nothing at all about the boundary dispute
with China, about the Aksai Chin road, or China’s proposal to settle the
boundary. After the Longju incident, word got out and the existence of
the Chinese road came to the House. Nehru coolly validated that the road
existed "through a corner of our north-eastern Ladakhi territory" and affirmed
that the Chinese claimed of "the hundreds of miles of Indian territory"
was "totally and manifestly unacceptable" and was not "a matter of discussion."
Nehru stated a few days later the importance of the "two miles of territory
in the high mountains, where nobody lives" entail "national prestige and
dignity." He stressed that China "having accepted broadly the McMahon Line,
I am prepared to discuss any interpretation of the McMahon Line" and "to
have arbitration of any authority agreed to by the two parties." About
the western sector of the border, Nehru was vague: "The point is, there
has never been any delimitation there in that area and it has been a challenged
area," but he maintained that "Aksai Chin was and had always been the historic
frontiers" of India.

Nehru’s tentativeness about the western sector soon ended with Dr. Gopal,
the director of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs,
who was sent to London to review materials on India’s northern borders.
Nehru told Gopal to disregard all contemporary political consideration
and to make an objective appraisal of the historical evidence. Gopal reported
in November 1959 that India’s claim to the Aksai Chin area was clearly
stronger than China’s. Gopal removed the reservations in Nehru, whose Government
has long adopted a policy that the McMahon Line must not be submitted to
renegotiations and, in 1954, the principle was extended to the rest of
the northern borders. Menon and other Cabinet members felt that the amateur
historian Nehru and the professional historian Gopal were taking the Government
in a wrong course. But they only expressed to Gopal and none stood up to
disagree with Nehru.

Chou En-lai replied to Nehru’s letter on September 8, 1959, and reaffirmed
the basic point that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been delimited,
further arguing that the 56,000 square miles between the McMahon Line and
the foothills had been Chinese. Chou restated the approach of the Chinese
Government: to reach a settlement through friendly negotiations, fair and
reasonable to both sides, taking into consideration the historical background
and existing actualities, and that in the meantime the status quo should
be observed. Chou suggested that China, like India, had been subjected
to imperialist aggression, and would like to adopt "an attitude of mutual
sympathy, mutual understanding and fairness and reasonableness" to settle
the boundary question. Chou raised the issue that India refused to recognize
the undelimited state of the boundary and attempted to impose upon China
its one-sided claims "militarily, diplomatically and through public opinion."
Chou finally asked India to withdraw "trespassing Indian troops and administrative
personnel" and suggested that would speedily dispel "the dark clouds hanging
over Sino-Indian relations."

The Indian Government read the letter as a veiled claim for the whole
NEFA. Chou’s previous assurance that China would accept the McMahon Line
almost disappeared. China suspected that India provided covert assistance
to the Tibetan rebels, allowed them to raid back along the McMahon Line,
and let Kuomintang agents operate freely in Kalimpong, smuggling saboteurs,
weapons and ammunition into Tibet. There was an outburst of anti-Chinese
sentiment and calls for war in India, but Nehru maintained his friendly
and calm tone, while publicly giving sympathy to the Dalai Lama. To the
boundary question, Nehru not only ruled out a settlement by negotiation,
but also advanced to a categorical claim to the segment of the Aksai Chin,
the only land route from Sinkiang to Tibet. He further pushed the Indian
forces forward across the McMahon Line and the western sectors. Nehru and
his government were in no mood to read between the lines of Chou’s letter,
which offered the settlement to be reached. They took the letter as proof
that they were faced with "a great and powerful nation which is aggressive."
Nehru replied to Chou expressing "great surprise and distress" and argued
that the boundaries had "always been the historical frontier" and were
settled by "history, geography, custom and tradition." Indian government
decided that it was dangerously against Indian interest to negotiate a
boundary settlement with China, and that the only reasonable ground to
refuse negotiation was the argument that the boundary is already delimited.
This argument was put forth for the international community, which now
started trying to follow the Sino-Indian debate.

The 1899 Macartney-MacDonald line was the only boundary alignment that
the British proposed to China, which left the whole of Aksai Chin on the
Chinese side. In his letter to Chou in September 1959, Nehru claimed the
reverse: that the 1899 line "signified beyond doubt that the whole of Aksai
Chin area lay in Indian territory." Nehru further introduced the Indian
demand for restoration of the status quo ante, which was a veiled demand
for unilateral Chinese withdrawal. The two clashes at Kongka and Longju
brought forth a convulsive response in Indian political opinion. Nehru’s
emphasis on long Sino-Indian friendship was criticized fiercely as "irrelevant,"
"hypocritical," "fatuous," and "dishonest." The critics proposed to pass
a resolution to take immediate action to "throw out" the Chinese. Nehru
dismissed these as "utterly wrong and useless," but affirmed that "at no
time since our independence, and of course before it, were our defense
forces in better condition, in finer fettle, … than they are today." Nehru
stressed that "I am quiet confidant that our defense forces are well capable
of looking after our security." Nehru’s allusions to the possibility of
war and assurance of the strong defense force nourished the impression
that war with China was a possibility and that it could be won. Thus far,
Nehru and his advisers choose the directions toward the war, with no significant
public pressure. By 1959, there was aroused political opinion that denounced
any compromise with China as appeasement or cowardice.

(ii)
Evasive Action

After the Kongka incident, Chou En-lai wrote Nehru on November 7, 1959,
and described it as unfortunate and unexpected. Chou proposed a summit
meeting to settle the entire boundary question through peaceful negotiations
and suggested that, in order to avoid further border clashes, the armed
forces of both sides should be withdrawn twenty kilometers from the McMahon
Line. China recommended that before the settlement, status quo should be
maintained which meant "the situation obtaining at present." India used
the word jiggling of "maintaining status quo" to mean Indian patrols moving
into the Chinese-held territory. Despite that the proposal of summit meeting
and demilitarization appeared consistent with the general approaches of
India, Nehru rejected the summit meeting with Chou En-lai, a decision almost
universally welcomed in India. In face of the Chinese willingness, indeed
eagerness, to settle the boundary dispute through negotiation, India instantly
rejected the idea of negotiations. The idea was solid that there should
be no discussions until China withdrew from Aksai Chin.

The Chinese proposal of mutual military withdraws placed India on the
diplomatic defensive. Nehru equivocated that the Chinese proposal was the
same as Indian position of total and unilateral Chinese withdrawal from
the disputed territory in the western sector. The Indians urged that "no
negotiations can take place on the basis of prior acceptance by China of
our frontiers and the immediate vacation of territories forcibly occupied
by them." Nehru made puzzling statements: "we will negotiate and negotiate
and negotiate to the bitter end. I absolutely reject the approach of stopping
negotiations at any state," and that "as far as I am concerned, I am prepared
to meet any body in the wide world." In fact, Nehru reaffirmed his position
that "we will never compromise on our boundaries, but we are prepared to
consider minor adjustments to them and to talk to the other side about
them." Nehru was to refuse to meet Chou En-lai until China accepted the
Indian version of the boundaries, and withdraw behind the Indian claim
line. However, the international community failed to appreciate the ambiguities
in Nehru’s words and almost universally blamed China, rather than India,
for refusing to negotiate a boundary settlement. The confidence of India
hardened after Chou En-lai pressed his proposal after the rejection of
a summit meeting. In December, Chou reiterated the Chinese position that
the joint military withdrawal along the border would not prejudice the
claims of either side. Nehru wrote Chou to explain the rejection of the
summit meeting that without preliminary agreement "we would lose ourselves
in a forest of data." Chou wrote back and emphasized the importance of
agreements that may prevent "endless and fruitless debates," and proposed
to meet on December 26, nine days after the delivery of the letter. Nehru
replied promptly and coldly expressing regret that his "very reasonable
proposals" for joint withdrawals had not been accepted, and that it was
impossible for him to meet Chou in the next few days.

The Indian refusal of the summit brought the diplomatic game to stalemate,
as China continued to treat the McMahon Line as the de facto boundary in
the eastern sector and the western sector unchallenged. From the moment
India accused China with "aggression" for the Chinese presence in Indian
claimed territory, the Indian Government was obliged to take actions, and
Nehru had pressed for a military operation against China and expected the
Government would comply. India thus far took for granted its international
esteem for its persistent advocate of a rational and civilized approach,
and negotiating table as a lightning conductor for international quarrels.
This Nehru stated at the end of 1959, "whether it is in the United Nations
or whether it is elsewhere, we are respected all over the world," and wondered
why "it has been an amazing thing." This was attributed to clever diplomacy,
the radiance of Gandhi, and "that we have spoken with conviction and earnestness
and sincerity about peace and our desire for peace and … for tolerance
… from deep inside our hearts and deep understanding of the world as it
is today." India by then occupied a unique position in the world. It was
called to act as referee peacemaker or arbitrator from Gaza to the Congo
and Korea, and was listened to with respect and courted for understanding.
India was the prime articulator of the concept of non-alignment and accepted
spokesman for the non-aligned countries. As personified in Nehru, India
contributed much to blunt the conflicts of the cold war.

India’s successful foreign policy was demonstrated by its acceptance
by both the USA and the USSR, of which presidents made successive visits
to New Delhi. The visit of President Eisenhower in December 1959 removed
the old disapproval of "immoral neutralism" and replaced it with cordial
sympathy. Eisenhower stated that the India "speaks to the other nations
of the world with greatness of conviction, and is heard with greatness
of respect" and especially appraised India’s falling out with China, even
before it became a public knowledge. The US economic aid to India multiplied
suddenly. It was $1.7 billion in the twelve years to mid-1959, and the
amount increased to $4 billion in the next four years. Both the US and
Soviet Union took a dispassionate view of the Sino-India dispute from the
beginning. As the Longju incident occurred on the eve of Krushchev’s visit
to the US, both the US and Russians have been carefully neutral and deplored
the incident as to "discredit the idea of peaceful co-existence." Those
who could read between the lines, the dispassionate regret of Moscow "in
reality condemned China’s stand." India took the tacit Russian support
as high importance. Western countries would readily accept the Indian version
of the dispute, and condemn China with, or even before, New Delhi. But
such sympathy and support was not easily forthcoming from the non-aligned
and especially of other Asian countries, as they were not prepared to accept
uncritically the proposition that China was wholly in the wrong. The Russians
had already expressed that negotiations were the only way to resolve the
border questions, and the fact that India had twice rejected China’s proposal
for a summit meeting would make it hard for the Russians to appreciate
Indian approach. India extended an invitation to Krushchev for a visit
and expected to clarify the validity of Indian approach to the boundary
dispute.

In the meantime, China wrote New Delhi another long note stating that
Peking was expected the summit meeting and that the Sino-Indian borders
were not delimited but China intended to settle the dispute through friendly
negotiations. New Delhi studied the note, felt the desire to end the dispute
sincere, and decided that there might be something to be gained by meeting
with Chou En-lai. It appeared that the summit meeting would serve Indian
interest in showing the watching world that India was consistent with its
prescriptions of advocating negotiations in every dispute. However, the
reversal of policy by dropping the insistence on Chinese withdrawal as
a precondition for a summit meeting, the domestic criticism and increasing
suspicion over compromise with China would be intensified. To overcome
this, a semantic smoke screen was created by making a distinction between
"talks" and "negotiations". The day after Krushchev arrived in New Delhi,
Nehru delivered a cordial, or even warm, invitation letter to Chou En-lai
on February 12, 1960, without informing his government. Nehru stated to
Parliament: "I see no ground whatever at the present moment, no bridge
between the Chinese position and ours," and "that is, the present positions
are such that there is no room for negotiations on that basis, and therefore
there is nothing to negotiate at present." The smoke screen covered the
general expectation that Krushchev’s visit would bring about negotiations
between China and India, and refusal to negotiate confirmed Parliament
that Nehru had no intention of meeting with Chou En-lai. On February 16,
the members of Parliament learned of the invitation from the newspapers.
The Opposition fumed anger on the "sudden and unwarranted reversal" of
policy, and described the invitation as a "national humiliation."

Chou En-lai accepted the invitation with "deep gratitude" and arranged
a seven-day visit on April 19. The Indian politicians suspected that Nehru
would compromise with China and the opposition declared of a "no-surrender
week," arranging demonstrations in New Delhi and other cities during Chou’s
visit in order to make "things hot" for the Chinese party. Nehru and the
Government made a nice compromise by ending the "no-surrender week" the
day before Chou arrived and holding no customary public receptions in Chou’s
honor. The oppositions reiterated their view of having no talks without
"Chinese vacation of aggression" and put out slogans "invaders, quit India,"
"no surrender of Indian territory," and "down with Chinese imperialism."
The oppositions found further international reason for refusing to negotiate
with China that ill-effects of compromise would "shatter the morale of
all" the rest of Asian countries "who are aspiring to build themselves
up independently and in a democratic way." The editorial placed on the
eve of Chou’s arrival that, if the talks succeeded, "China’s prestige and
power will be enhanced in the eyes of the smaller Asian countries, for
India’s action will be construed as acquiescence in and compliance with
China’s attitude." If talks broke down, "India will be held up as unreasonable,
(but better) to be held up temporarily as unreasonable than to be dismissed
as weak and pusillanimous." The pressure not to settle was further increased
by the dispute with Pakistan. One month before Chou’s arrival, the Indian
Supreme Court reinforced the inflexible approach on the northern boundaries
and challenged the compromise that Nehru made with small patch of disputed
territory of several square miles with Pakistan.

On April 19, 1960, Chou En-lai arrived in New Delhi, accompanied by
Marshall Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister, and a large party. The cheer of
"Hindee Chinee bhai-bhai" of yesteryear was replaced with only a
polite patter of applause from the diplomats. Both sides exchanged speeches
of greeting. Nehru recalled the good will between China and India, and
said "unfortunately other events have taken place since then which have
put a great strain on the bond of friendship and given a great shock to
all our people." Chou replied: "Both of us need peace, both of us need
friends," "there is no reason why any question between us cannot be settled
reasonably through friendly consultations in accordance with those principles"
of Panch Sheel, and concluded that "I have come with the sincere
desire to settle questions."

In the following days of visit, the Indian Government maintained adamant
and immovable position: there could be no general boundary negotiations;
the boundaries were already delimited and ran just where India said they
did; and China must withdraw before there could be any of the discussions
on "minor rectifications" that were all India would agree to. Chou En-lai
reiterated that the Sino-Indian boundary question had been left over from
history, and not created by either of the two Governments: it was "only
an issue of a limited and temporary nature" and it was "entirely possible
to achieve a fair and reasonable overall settlement." China was proposing
"reciprocal acceptance of present actualities in both sectors and constitution
of a boundary commission." China would accept the McMahon alignment in
the western sector, while India would accepted the positions then obtaining
in the west. There would be no physical withdrawals involved, as the forward
posts on both sides were far apart, but India would drop the claim to Aksai
Chin. Chou En-lai maintained the position that he took since his the first
meeting with Nehru, that although the McMahon Line was not fair, Chinese
Government would accept it because of its friendly relations with Burma
and India. After India expressed its claim to Aksai Chin in the note of
October 18, 1958, China consistently treated the Indian presence in the
territory south of the McMahon Line the same as the Chinese presence in
Aksai Chin. China made it clear in the summit meeting that China would
accept the McMahon alignment provided that India accept the Chinese control
line in the west. However, India insisted on the sin qua non of a boundary
settlement that China must concede that Aksai Chin was Indian territory
as well as accepting the McMahon Line. The conference had failed from the
outset, but the summit meeting continued for the remaining five more days,
neither side wished it to break down.

A press conference was held prior to Chou’s departure. Chou concisely
reiterated the Chinese position: that the boundary had never been delimited,
that the question could be settled through friendly consultations, and
that, pending settlement, "both sides should maintain the present state
of the boundary and not change it by unilateral action, let along by force."
In the meantime the friendship between China and India should not, and
could not, be jeopardized by the boundary question. Chou stated that Chinese
government, like those before it, could never recognize the McMahon Line
because it was "illegally delineated through an exchange of secret notes
by British imperialism with the Tibetan local authorities." Nevertheless,
he said, China was observing the Line as the boundary, and had not put
forward territorial claims as pre-conditions in the negotiations. The press
conference displeased the Indians. Nehru waited only until the Chinese
were airborne and dwindling in the eastern sky on their way to Katmandu
before attacking the Chinese Government as aggressors. He said that Chou
En-lai "came here because something important had happened, the important
thing being that according to us they had entered our territory … which
we considered aggression." After learning Nehru’s word, Chou later was
not amused but was "very much distressed by such an attitude, particularly
as we respect Prime Minister Nehru." The summit meeting thus failed on
the unyielding refusal of India to give up, modify or hold over its claim
to the Aksai Chin territory. With Burma, China accepted the McMahon alignment
as the basis of the boundary, and with Nepal, "adjustments were made in
accordance with the principles of equality, mutual benefit, friendship
and mutual accommodation." The Chinese maps showed Mount Everest within
China, but China accepted the Nepali (and general) view that the peak itself
marked the boundary. Both sides agreed to keep their armed personnel out
of a forty-kilometer zone along the boundary. Chou En-lai maintained that
the summit had not failed, but the summit cleared the way for a worsening
of the situation on the borders. As Chou En-lai faced the American and
Indian correspondents who questioned with hostility and suspicion, Chen
Yi broke in: "I want to call your attention to the fact that China is a
country which is being wronged. I want to stress, China is a country which
is being wronged."

Part
II: The Forward Policy

The Indians had no doubt about their inherent position that Aksai Chin
had been incontrovertibly Indian territory and that the Chinese claim was
factitious and concocted to camouflage illegal and clandestine seizure.
By describing the Chinese presence as an act or aggression, the Indian
Government obliged itself to take actions, even to use force if diplomatic
methods failed. It was decided that India "must assert its rights by dispatching
properly equipped patrols into the areas currently occupied by the Chinese,
since any prolonged failure to do so will imply a tacit acceptance of Chinese
occupation, and … Indian patrols penetrate into disputed areas of Ladakh."
By the time Chou En-lai left, Indian Government had started implementing
a "forward policy," by sending patrols to probe the Chinese-occupied areas
and penetrating the spaces between the Chinese positions without attacking
them. The objectives were to block potential lines of further Chinese advance
and to establish an Indian presence in Aksai China, ultimately undermine
Chinese control of the disputed areas by the interposition of Indian posts
and patrols between Chinese positions, thus cutting the Chinese supply
lines and forcing them to withdraw. The forward policy sprang from the
conclusion that there was nothing else India could do. It was based on
the fundamental premise that the Chinese would not physically interfere
no matter how many Indians posts and patrols were set up, provided that
the Indians did not attack any Chinese positions. As soon as the dispute
started in 1954, the advance of the Indian boundary posts in the middle
sectors intended to threaten with force against the Chinese who maintained
their positions, but Nehru and his colleagues had absolute faith that the
Chinese would not act likewise. The confidence in the moral unassailability
was embedded in the belief that the British were reluctant to use force
and if the Chinese did attack, it would rebound against them. It reflected
Nehru’s perception that the unique position of India in the world, with
the reputation and depth of its pacific instincts, would go with the Indian
patrols into Aksai Chin like a moral armor. Nehru and his colleagues held
this belief, that the Chinese would stand idly while India gradually and
laboriously built up positions of strength, until the brutal disabuse took
place in October 1962.

The Oppositions and critics in India began to cherish the phrase "police
action," that "to defend your own territory is not to wage war" and "that
if you throw out bandits … is just police action on your own territory."
"We as a peaceful nation who are members of the UN do not believe in war
as any remedy … therefore … the only way is to have a police action whereby
we can push the Chinese out of our territory … after that have a basis
for negotiation." Others argued that war was not the ultimate catastrophe
or even an unmixed evil. It was believed that small and local wars could
not always be avoided, and "when such wars are fought … the wisdom of the
world" would localize them and would find a workable solution later. "So
we need not scare ourselves that any resistance to Chinese aggression will
lead to a world war and a destruction of humanity. The world will see to
it that this does not happen." The opposition emphasized that "it is conflict
that brings out the best in a country, that brings about unity," and that
the danger would be turned to good effect "to achieve national cohesion
and spur national endeavor." However, Nehru consistently stressed the dangers
of war, that "war between India and China would be one of the major disasters
of the world … for it will mean world war … which will be indefinite. We
would not be able to limit it in time, because it will not be possible
for China to defeat us and it will be impossible for us to march up to
Peking across Tibet." In the rhetoric allusions to the ultimate possibility
of war, the conceived context was that India was going to war for its territory
after exhausting its patience and gaining a position of strength. It never
occurred to New Delhi that war might arise from Chinese reaction to or
anticipation of Indian moves. Nehru and his colleagues were unwavering
in their faith that whatever India did along the borders, China would not
attack. This basic assumption was the basis of the forward policy, a military
challenge to a militarily far superior neighbor.

The Indian armed forces had been neglected in the 1950s. Nehru and Indian
Congress ruled out possible threats to India one by one, and concluded
that "no danger threatens India from any direction, and even if there is
any danger we shall be able to cope with it." As for China, the Himalayas
made "an effective barrier and not even air fleets could come that way."
It was believed that its size, its geo-strategic position and the interest
of the great powers would keep India immune from any significant external
attacks. "If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt" to acquiring
the commanding position, "all the others would combine to trounce the intruder.
This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against an
attack on India." Nehru held this rational and pragmatic view of external
threats to India after independence and until the main Chinese assault
in November 1962. The Indian Government stressed on development to come
first. Military aid from abroad was considered unacceptable since it would
impair India’s non-alignment and be unreliable. The positively pacific,
almost pacifist approach to international relations, the emphasis on development,
and insistence on non-alignment, all reinforced the Gandhian disapproval
of men of war as part of the Indian Congress attitude. The civilian leadership
thus placed the soldiers into disadvantaged position. After Menon became
the Defense Minister in 1957, he was warmly welcomed for being energetic
and politically relevant. The military had misgivings about Menon’s interference
in steadily promoting officer Kaul, who played a central and disastrous
role in the border war. Following its conception in the beginning of 1960,
the total lack of military means made the Army resist the implementation
of the forward policy until the end of 1961.

While the Sino-Indian border dispute halted, China proceeded to negotiate
boundary settlements with other neighbors. Since 1954, the US equipped
and trained Pakistan’s armed forces and it became no longer easy for India
to defeat Pakistan. From 1960, the Indian Government tried to tutor Pakistan
to adopt the Indian approach and the same attitude in dealing with China
over the northern frontier. Instead, Pakistan agreed with China that the
boundary had never been delimited and negotiated with China on October
13, 1962. By December 26, 1962, the two Governments jointed announced to
have reached "complete agreement in principle," in which China followed
for the great part what the British had proposed to China in 1899 and ceded
some 750 square miles of territory to Pakistan. With Burmese Prime Minister,
U Nu, China sought a settlement since 1956. U Nu found that after having
emphatically repudiated all past boundary agreements with the British,
China was prepared to open negotiations on the basis of what the British
proposed. China found the "unequal treaties" imposed by Britain as unacceptable,
but not the alignment that the British proposed. China offered Burma the
whole Sino-Burmese boundary along McMahon Line, an agreement converted
to a treaty in October 1960. China settled the boundaries with other neighbors
equably and equitably shaded an adverse light on India’s position, but
brought more sharply the deadlock between India and China. India reiterated
its boundary could not be a matter of negotiation, and denied "the necessity
of further or formal delimitation." China replied that "refusing to negotiate
and trying to impose a unilaterally claimed alignment on China is in actuality
refusal to settle the boundary questions," and warned that while India
maintained the position, China would "absolutely not retreat an inch."

By the spring of 1961, Nehru found the Chinese position unchanged. China
was still ready, indeed eager, to negotiate a boundary settlement with
India, while indicating that China would agree to the McMahon Line. In
the fall of 1961, Nehru Government gave categorical orders for immediate
implementation of the forward policy. China protested about forward moves
already made from Demchok that "the Chinese Government has been following
with great anxiety the Indian troops" pressing forward on China’s borders
in "gross violations of China’s territory and sovereignty," which would
have serious consequences had it not been orders to avoid conflicts. India
asserted that the Indian patrols were moving into their own territory and
rejected the Chinese protest as unwarranted interference in their internal
affairs, as they viewed that "according to our thinking our trouble at
the border is not a dispute at all." The Goa incident further reinforced
India’s readiness to take unilateral and forceful action in territorial
question. Goa had been a Portuguese colony on the west coast since the
beginning of the sixteenth century. The Portuguese stayed on after the
British left the subcontinent in 1947, but never thought of giving the
Goans independence. In 1955, India attempted to force Portugal to cede
Goa through nonviolent demonstrations, but Portuguese police opened fire,
killing several and wounding many. India severed diplomatic ties with Portugal,
but the Portuguese stayed on in Goa. In the end of 1961, the Indian government
decided to give its resolve military demonstration to China by invading
Goa. With minimal resistance, India seized Goa, but it became more of a
scandal and an irritant to India, especially to Nehru, in face of their
persistent advocacy of the doctrine never to justify the use of force as
a means of settling international disputes. India insisted that the military
operation did not breach the prescription, and few came to criticize Indian
action. President Kennedy wrote to Nehru: "All countries, including the
USA, have a great capacity for convincing themselves of the full righteousness
of their particular cause." The Indian press supported: "Why is it that
something that thrills our people should be condemned in the strongest
language?" A political journal summed up the Indian view of the seizure
of Goa: "No aggression has been committed, because we have regarded Goa
ever since 1947 as our rightful territory … To drive out an intruder who
is in illegal occupation of part of our territory is not aggression."

The Goa incident reflected the amorphous and subjective processes within
which the Indian Government operated. Neither the seizure of Goa nor the
forward policy was decided upon in Cabinet. It showed the dualities of
India’s attitude toward the use of force: reprehensible in the abstract
and in the service of others, but justifiable both politically and morally
when employed by India in disputes. Some politicians were intoxicated by
the Goa victory as talks began of driving Pakistan out of Kashmir and forcing
China out of Aksai Chin. The Home Minister, Shastri, paralleled the Goa
incident with China: "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas … India
will have to repeat what she did in Goa." The president of the Congress
Party announced that India was "determined to get Pakistani and Chinese
aggression on its soil vacated before long" and that Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir must be "liberated." However, the military operation in Goa did
not test the capabilities of the troops or their commanders, as the Portuguese
put up no organized resistance against the overwhelmingly superior Indian
forces. The Army had been experiencing chronic shortage of boots, and half
of one battalion went through the operation in canvas gym shoes. Although
this was discussed widely in the Army, little came out in India, which
called the operation "our finest hour."

The easy victory over the Portuguese encouraged the hope of similar
success against the Chinese. Nehru had repeatedly assured Parliament and
public that the Army and other services were stronger than they have been,
and were ready to defeat any challenges to the integrity of India. The
Indian army would quickly teach the Chinese a lesson in the event of a
conflict. Nehru said that the boundary dispute with China was more important
to India than a hundred Goas. Although India now had rejected the Chinese
proposal for a joint twenty-kilometer withdrawal, China had unilaterally
stopped patrolling within twenty-kilometers of the bounder. India refused
to open negotiations, and steadily pushed forward, first in the middle
and eastern sectors and now in the west. China warned that India’s action
"is most dangerous and may lead to grave consequences," but "so far as
the Chinese is concerned the door for negotiation is always open." India
insisted that the Sino-Indian boundary had long been settled and justified
the forward policy as "the legitimate right, indeed the duty, of the Government
of India to take all necessary measures to safeguard the territorial integrity
of India." The forward policy continued as small Indian posts were being
established overlooking Chinese positions and sometimes astride the tracks
or roads behind them. The theory was that interruption of the communication
lines would ultimately force the Chinese to withdraw from their posts.
Nehru dismissed the increasingly emphatic Chinese warnings of "grave consequences,"
and explained to Parliament that the Chinese became "rather annoyed" as
the Indian posts were set up behind their own. Nehru reassured the doubtful
members who though Chinese tone dangerous: "There is nothing to be alarmed
at, although the (Chinese) note threatens all kinds of steps," and that
"if they do take those steps we shall be ready for them."

As Nehru assured Parliament that the position in the western sector
was "more advantageous to India," the forwarding Indians in the Ladakh
were outnumbered by the Chinese by more than five to one. The strength
disparity was beyond the numbers. The Chinese were concentrated where the
Indians were scattered; the Chinese were able to move in trucks where the
Indians trekked on foot; and the Chinese had all regular supports arms
for the troops while the Indian Brigade had nothing beyond one platoon
of medium machine-guns. The Chinese ranged heavy mortars and recoilless
guns on the Indian posts, and infantry equipped with automatic rifles.
The Indians had nothing heavier than three-inch mortars and most posts
even lacked those, their troops equipped with rifles last seen in action
before the First World War. In early 1961, the Chinese began to react vigorously
on the ground. As the Indians set up a post overlooking a Chinese position,
the Chinese promptly took up more positions around it. Since April 1959,
the Chinese also resumed the suspended patrol in the western sectors and
warned to resume patrolling everywhere if Indians continued the forward
movement. China also warned that the continued Indian "pressing on the
Chinese post and carrying out provocation" would compel the Chinese troops
to defend themselves, and that India would be responsible for the consequences.
The Indian Government dismissed the warnings as bluff and the threatening
Chinese moves as bluster. In the Chip Chap valley, the Chinese formed in
assault formation and gave every indication to wipe out the Indian post.
Western Command requested permission to withdraw the post, but Nehru believed
that the Chinese were making a show of force to test India’s resolution
and ordered to reinforce the post. The Chinese later did not follow up
on the threats, and the Indian Government and Army concluded the judgement
and nerve of the Prime Minister, further confirming the basic premise of
the forward policy, which was further validated by the subsequent Galwan
incident.

The Indian Amy map showed Galwan valley as one of the best routes to
move into Chinese-held territory, which was one of Kaul’s orders to establish
a post in November 1961. The terrain in the valley was extremely difficult
and the Chinese had already had a post there since at least 1959. After
the winter pasted, Western Command decided that any move to threaten the
well-established Chinese post would certainly evoke a violent reaction,
and concluded that no Indian post could be established. But Kaul overruled
the command. After over a month of trekking, the Indians emerged on the
upper reaches of the Galwan River, and took positions, on July 5, 1962
to cut off a Chinese outpost and also hold up a small Chinese supply party.
On July 8, the Chinese first made diplomatically "strongest protest" asking
for immediate withdrawal of the Indian troops and warning that China would
not "give up its right to self-defense when unwarrantedly attacked." India
replied that India has "regularly been patrolling the Galwan valley" and
has "never encountered any Chinese infiltrators" there, and lodged "an
emphatic protest" against the Chinese "unwarranted aggressive activity"
on the ground. India warned China to be entirely responsible for any untoward
incident if China did not "stop the incessant intrusions deep inside Indian
territory and ceaseless provocative activities against Indian border guards."
The Chinese reacted on the ground advancing on the Indian post with a company
in assault formation and quickly building up to battalion strength. In
response, the External Affairs Ministry called the Chinese Ambassador and
warned that the garrison would open fire if the Chinese troops pressed
any closer to the Galwan post, and that India would retaliate against Chinese
positions if the post were attacked. In a few days, the Chinese pulled
back a little while continuing to surround the post in relatively great
strength, cutting off the ground supply. Western Command requested for
air supply since any land approach would provoke a clash. India decided
that, since China blinked in the confrontation that now relaxed, the moral
initiative must be maintained. A small force was dispatched to reinforce
Galwan. It was turned back under the Chinese guns, which warned to fire
if it advanced any farther. The Galwan post was supplied by air until it
was wiped out on October 20.

The news of the Galwan incident appeared in India on July 11, as a new
and provocative Chinese advance into Indian territory. When the Chinese
did not follow up on their physical and diplomatic threats, a wave of triumph
swept the press and the politicians. It was believed that the incident
raised the morale of the whole nation, and the Chinese withdrew "in the
face of the determined stand of the small Indian garrison." The orders
given to the Indian garrison were extended to all Indian troops in the
western sectors, and the "fire only if fired upon" changed to "fire if
the Chinese press dangerously close to your positions." Nehru further decided
that the military moves had to be coupled with diplomatic pressure. Nehru
assured the Indian Parliament with a proposal that would withdraw very
large Chinese and very small Indian withdrawal. It was hoped that, with
the establishment of Indian posts in Chinese-claimed territory, China would
accept what the Indians considered to be the best way of saving face, the
complete withdrawal, and that the few Indian posts already established
might have brought China to that position. China rejected the proposal
as "unilaterally imposed submissive terms" and questioned: "Why should
China need to ask India’s permission for using its own road on its own
territory?" New Delhi concluded that the forward policy had not yet presented
enough pressure and decided that it must be pursued until China accepted
to withdraw.

The Indian troops pressed hard in the western sector, acting as if they
were the vanguard of a powerful army rather than the stake in a wild political
gamble. Meanwhile the domestic critics demanded stronger and quicker action
against China. To defend itself, the Government drew lines to connect the
new forward Indian posts on maps and calculated the enclosed area. One
journalist praised the Prime Minister for "a general advance over a wide
front of 2,500 square miles" and complimented Nehru as "a unique triumph
for audacious Napoleonic planning." Only sporadic report was made on the
real situation that the Chinese had a ten-to-one superiority in the western
sector and also all the advantages of terrain and communications. Most
reported on the superior strength and better equipment of the Indians over
Chinese, the latter as garrison troops of poor fighting quality. The Opposition
in India further pushed for yet stronger measures to expel the Chinese.
It was claimed that "The bogey of Chinese superiority … should not worry
our military experts" and that "two hundred Indian soldiers are equal to
two thousand of the Chinese," and asked "Why should we be afraid of them?
Why are we not able to hurl them back?" When the Indian Ambassador (Nehru’s
cousin) in Washington expressed the truth that the Indian defense forces
were so badly equipped that they could not ensure the security of the country,
he was ignored. Nehru repeatedly assured Parliament that the Army was capable
of defending the frontiers, and suggested disciplining the Ambassador for
an indiscretion.

Saner voices in the Government suggested that India should give China
the same pledge as it gave to Pakistan with respect to the Pakistan-held
and Indian-claimed part of Kashmir, and a daily newspaper also urged the
Government to negotiate. However, the overwhelmingly dominant attitudes
in Parliament were not to negotiate. After Kongka Pass incident on July
21, 1962, China protested. "China is not willing to fight with India, and
the Sino-Indian boundary question can be settled only through routine negotiations."
China had exercised self-restraint, but could not stand idle while the
"frontier guards are being encircled and annihilated by aggressors … If
India should ignore the warning and persist in its own way India must bear
full responsibility for all the consequences." India replied on July 26,
reminding China that under certain conditions India was prepared to "enter
into further discussions" on the boundary question. But India was firm
in its position that before any negotiations, China must withdraw all personnel
from the India-claimed territory, and when the evacuation was complete,
India would meet China at the conference table to discuss minor modifications
of the boundary India claimed. In response, China reciprocated the reasonable
and positive tone, but rejected the condition of "one-sided withdrawal
from large tracts of its own territory," while accepting the proposal for
discussion. "The Chinese Government approves of the suggestion put forth
by the Indian Government for further discussion … As a matter of fact,
if only the Indian side stop advancing into Chinese territory, a relaxation
of the border situation will be affected at once… The Chinese Government
proposes that such discussions be held as soon as possible..." India considered
the discussions with China served no purpose since China explicitly rejected
the "one-sided withdrawal," which India considered as the only acceptable
settlement.

India had all the advantages of world opinions, as the newsstands were
packed with supporters. The press and governments of the Western world
cheered India as it stood against what they believed to be the expansionist
China. The historical and documentary arguments about the boundary were
too obscure except for the specialists, to whom the archives that might
show which side was nearer the truth were closed. Although the invasion
of Goa injured India’s reputation, there was generally no hesitation in
the West to take the Indian side. As Felix Green explained the American
reaction: "So solidly built into our consciousness is the concept that
China is conducting a rapacious and belligerent foreign policy that whenever
a dispute arises in which China is involved, she is instantly assumed to
have provoked it. All commentaries, ‘news reports,’ and scholarly interpretations
are written on the basis of this assumption. The cumulative effect of this
only further reinforces the original hypothesis so that it is used again
next time with even greater effect." The Americans viewed the conflict
as a race between China and India for the economic and political leadership
in Asia. In 1959, then Senator JF Kennedy said: "We want India to win that
race with China …if China succeeds and India fails the economic-development
balance of power will shift against us." Kennedy’s estimation lowered sharply
when the Prime Minister visited Washington in November 1961. The president
later described it as "the worst head-of-state visit" ever, and his conversations
with Nehru as "like trying to grab something in your hand only to have
it turn out to be just fog." The British Government’s support for India
was as solid as that of the US except for a division of opinion. Some officials
in the Foreign Office pointed out that India’s account of the historical
argument for the boundaries was inflated and recommended less than categorical
British support for the Indian claims. But as British viewed that its interest
was concerned, it gave wholehearted and unqualified support for India.

In contrast to the committed support of the Western world, the Afro-Asian
countries clung to the question of negotiation as the ground to decide
their position in the diplomatic-historical argument between China and
India. It seemed that China wanted India to negotiate a settlement, while
India was refusing. But India proclaimed that in fact it was the other
way around. To avoid the risk of too blunt refusing the negotiation, Nehru
made a statement on August 13, reaffirming that there could be no discussion
without Chinese withdrawal. "The Government of India is prepared to discuss"
not about the alignment of the boundaries, but about the steps by which
Chinese withdrew from India-claimed territory. The surrender had to be
unconditional, but the Chinese were welcome to discuss the details of the
surrender ceremony. In the same speech, Nehru quoted Chen Yi’s statement
in Geneva that "to wish that Chinese troops would withdraw from their own
territory is impossible." Nehru accused China of "laying down preconditions
which make it impossible for us to carry on discussions and negotiations."
The Indian argument was that the discussions prior to Chinese withdrawal
would be "pre-judging or acceptance of the Chinese claim," whereas the
Chinese withdrawal before discussion would be "prejudging or acceptance
of the Indian claim."

In the meantime, the new "great games" on the borders were reaching
climax. At the beginning of September, in the Chip Chap valley, the Indians
put into effect of the orders they had been given since the Galwan confrontation,
firing into and killing several Chinese who advanced close to one of the
Indian posts. By the end of August, the Indians had placed nearly forty
posts in Chinese-claimed territory, most staffed between a dozen to thirty
and fifty men. They were more than vulnerable, in fact helpless, as they
were outnumbered and outgunned. The question was not how long they could
resist, if they were attacked, but was how many Chinese they could kill
before being wiped out. They were the hostages of the Indian conviction,
civilian and military, that China would never attack, as Kaul reported:
"I am convinced that the Chinese will not attack any of our positions even
if they are relatively weaker than theirs." The Chinese protests became
more threatening as August passed into September. "If the Indian side should
insist on threatening by armed force the Chinese border defense forces….
and thereby rouse their resistance, it must bear the responsibility for
all the consequences arising therefrom." Meanwhile, two Russian lumber
freighters were among ships delivering arms to Cuba, of which significance
was to be recognized later by the U.S. Government.

Part
III: The View from Peking

Two distinct and divergent strains governed China’s attitude toward
India. One placed India in historical and dialectical context of the Marxist-Leninist
framework, and the other as a neighbor and fellow Asian power. In late
1940s, India appeared to be on the anti-revolutionary path as the US shifted
support to India after the bitter ending of supporting Chiang Kai-shek.
In 1949, a Shanghai journal accused Nehru and Indian Government’s pursuance
of British policy as serving "the Anglo-American imperialist designs for
the annexation of Tibet" and of nourishing imperialist intentions. In December
1949, India was second country to recognize the People’s Republic of China,
only after Burma, and actively advocated presenting the new Peking Government
as the representative of China in the United Nations. Subsequently, India
played an important role in the ceasefire negotiations in Korea and also
in prisoner-of-war repatriation. During the years of Hindee Chinee bhai-bhai
in
the middle 1950s, there was muted resentment. Chou En-lai commented
in 1965 of Nehru’s "arrogance" and told some visiting Ceylonese politicians
that "I have never met a more arrogant man than Nehru." However, the general
attitudes toward India were genuinely friendly while a little patronizing.
The Indian perception was that India and China were like twins in standing,
with Indian seniority, and that it had been largely through India’s effort
that "Communist China acquired a measure of respectability throughout Asia."

In 1958, as Nehru was constant in his support for China’s rightful seat
in the UN, the People’s Daily summed Nehru as "a friend to China and an
opponent to the imperialist policy of war and aggression." Thus far Nehru’s
polices were consistent with Leninist scheme of a progressive nationalism,
in which a temporary but valid alliance formed between the bourgeoisie
and part o the exploited classes in the first stage of struggle against
imperialism. In 1959, as the Dalai Lama fled to India, Chinese had no objections,
as Chou En-lai said that it was normal international practice to grant
the Dalai Lama sanctuary, although they complained of the impressive welcome
extended to the Dalai Lama. Later Indian Government did not keep up its
promise that the Dalai Lama would not be allowed to engage in political
activities against China while he was in India. China also complained of
the Kuomintang and American agents who were actively supporting the Tibetan
émigrés in Kalimpong, channeling anti-Chinese propaganda,
weapons and agents across the still very open border. China denounced the
rebellion in Tibet as counter-revolution and an attempt to sustain the
"dark, cruel and barbarous serf system" by the class that benefited from
it. As the US started developing designs on India’s non-aligned virtue,
especially the emergence of the Indian approach to the boundary questions,
China began to watch Indian attitudes and policy for signs that India entered
the imperialists’ camp. China regarded seriously India’s unilateral and
unannounced modification of the McMahon Line and the establishment of posts.
In the Longju incident, the Indians fired first. In Kongka Pass incident,
a large Indian patrol attempted to move into Chinese-occupied territory
and set up post there. This was more ominous as it concerned an area of
thousands of square miles, with high strategic importance to China.

China viewed the Indian’s insistence for China to accept the unilateral
Indian definition of boundary what "British imperialism had fabricated
covertly but never dared to put forward." India claimed Aksai Chin in which
it did not have any material interests, and China regarded this as "India’s
… demand that China get out of her only traffic route to Western Tibet,
a road India has no use for, was … seeking injury to China without benefit
to India." India’s attempt for rough disdain for Chinese national sensibilities
was nothing new to China. The Chinese history was replete with boundaries
unilaterally imposed by stronger countries and with foreign arrogance and
power. But now, "the days when the Chinese people could be bossed around
are gone for ever." Chen Yi said mildly that by imposing the McMahon Line
on China, India had not "given the slightest consideration to the sense
of national pride and self-respect of the Chinese people." In spite of
China’s reasonable approach, India took a path that led to an intractable
dispute and "created tensions in relations" with China.

China submitted the Indian actions and attributed the root cause of
the boundary dispute to the prisms of Marxist-Leninist analysis in the
"ever-sharpening class contradictions and social contradictions and the
deepening political crisis facing the Nehru Government." By the beginning
of 1960, the Indian Government substituted reactionary nationalism for
anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, and inclined itself closer
to the imperialist and feudal forces. China considered Nehru as a captive
of the forces of reaction and that he may free himself to bring forth a
progressive influence on Indian policy. The People’s Daily wrote that Nehru
was "respected in China" and regretted that Nehru had "let himself be drawn
into the whirlpool of anti-Chinese agitation in India." The Chinese attitude
to Nehru changed after the summit talks of April 1960. Chou En-lai was
shocked by Nehru’s intransigence and described Nehru as impossible to negotiate
with, "being both unreliable and impenetrable." Chou resented that "he
did not say it face to face, but as soon as we had left he attacked the
Chinese Government as aggressors." China did not openly denounce Nehru
until late in 1962, but from 1960 regarded Nehru as "the loyal representative
of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India" and stooge of China’s
international enemies.

The Indian Government also fulfilled China’s ideological expectations
as the American assistance doubled in four years, as compared to previous
twelve years, after Eisenhower’s visit in 1959. The conclusion was obvious:
"The more anti-Chinese India is, the greater is the increase in US aid,"
which had increased "in direct proportion to the extent to which the Nehru
Government has served United States imperialism and opposed China." In
the Chinese analysis of the Indian politico-economic polices after independence,
India continued as a colonial economy, with its foreign investment increasing
150 per cent by 1960, in which the British share doubled and American multiplied,
as India became more dependent on foreign aid. A conservative Indian journal,
Capital, pointed out in 1960 that "almost he entire third plan depends
on (foreign aid): if the foreign aid does not come, the plan will have
to be scrapped, since India’ sown foreign exchange reserves are already
below the minimum." In 1962, an independent journal, United Asia, concluded
on the pervasive and profound dependence of Indian economy, that "any drastic
cuts in, or cessation, of foreign aid would immediately engender a major
economic crisis in India, accompanied by the closing down of large numbers
of companies, reduced productions, unemployment and uncontrollable inflation."
China noted later: "Whenever imperialist ‘aid’ appears, genuine economic
sovereignty and economic independence vanish for all practical purposes."

In the beginning of 1960s, China saw the frequent use of force by Indian
Government as the armory of repressive measures inherited from the British.
Chinese found another passage from Nehru’s own Marxist phase to describe
the political processes in India: "So long as capitalism can use the machinery
of democratic institutions to hold down and keep down labor, democracy
is allowed to flourish, but when this is not possible than capitalism discards
democracy and adopts the open fascist methods of violence and terror."
China viewed that the Indian Government has made itself "the pawn of the
international anti-China campaign," and concluded that "is the root cause
and background of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute," which was created
as a pretext for domestic and international propaganda. The Chinese policy
toward other governments springs from how they act towards China, not from
the political characters, as stated in a motto: "It’s not what you are,
it’s the way that you act." This was illustrated in the Chinese attitudes
towards Pakistan, which pursued an unfriendly policy towards China through
the 1950s, but changed course at the end of 1959. The settlement of the
Sino-Pakistani boundary lead to cordial and civil relations with China,
and ultimately a tacit alliance against India. China did not make the full
ideological denunciation of Nehru and his Government until very late in
the border dispute, and anathematized Nehru in October 1962, while continuing
to stress Sino-Indian friendship and that China would never close the door
to a negotiated settlement. China repeatedly reiterated that "there is
no conflict of fundamental interests between China and India," and that
the boundary question was essentially one of small and temporary importance.

The Longju incident had a destructive impact for Sino-Soviet relations.
The incident was reported without question in the Indian version that it
was an instance of deliberate and unprovoked aggression by China. The Chinese
account of the clash was ignored and subsequent Nehru’s admission that
the boundary was "varied" by India "because it was not considered a good
line" completely missed. Western observers were so convinced already that
China was a bellicose and bullying power that the incident was interpreted
accordingly, confirming their preconception. On September 6, Chinese informed
the Soviet Union the background of the incident that it occurred on the
Chinese side of the McMahon Line and the Indians fired at the Chinese frontier
guards first. But the explanation carried no conviction with the Russians,
who were to release a statement three days later. China handed a letter
of Chou En-lai that was written to Nehru on September 8 in a sharply worded
statement that the "trespassing and provocations by Indian troops" caused
the armed clash at Longju. China urged Russia not to release the statement,
but it was circulated that night, which indicated the agreement of the
"leading circles" of Soviet Union regretting the incident. Soviet Union
deplored that the two largest Asian countries discredited the idea of peaceful
coexistence, and expressed confidence that "both Governments will settle
the misunderstanding that has arisen." While Nehru viewed the position
as "a more or less dispassionate view of the situation," China reacted
violently to the Russian Government for "assuming a façade of neutrality"
and "making no distinction between right and wrong," which by implication
favored India and condemned China.

China was faced with double difficulty that was to beset and damage
China in dealing with India. There was a credibility gap in which the universal
tendency of people to accept the Indian version as the truth, and also
the general readiness to conclude that Indians got the worst of the battle
and they could not have possibly have provoked it. A conflict of doctrines
emerged between China and India. Krushchev flatly denounced the war as
an instrument of policy, for he believed that "force … must absolutely
not be used against he capitalist world, no matter how strong the Communists
might be." Krushchev placed his denunciation of the "Left revisionists"
in Peking in handling the dispute with India. Krushchev rejected Chinese
complaint that the Soviet Union had let them down by refusing to take side
against India. In contrast he blamed China for having let down the cause
of socialism and, by quarrelling with India, China failed to cooperate
with the Soviet Union in encouraging India to move toward socialism. China
was advised to take heart of Lenin’s denunciation of great-nation chauvinism,
and accused China for having made Nehru a national hero in India, which
was exactly what the imperialists wanted. The Soviet Union approached its
boundary problems responsibly. Had it acted like China, it would have declared
war on Iran more than once, after repeated clashes on the Russian-Iranian
frontier and with casualties. The Russian position, ironically, was precisely
the same as China’s, as Pravda put it: "We have always believed, and continue
to believe, that there were no reasons for the border conflict between
India and China … There is no doubt that had the two sides sat down at
a conference table and discussed their mutual charges calmly, soberly and
without bias, the conflict would have been settled long ago…" Although
this was consistent with Chinese argument again and again urging India
in an attempt to convince India that the boundaries must be settled by
negotiation, the Soviet Union appeared to have concluded that the Chinese
were lying in their accounts and hypocritical in their proposals of negotiation.
They could not believe that as week a country as India would actually challenge
China. The demonstrative neutrality of Soviet Union encouraged India to
persist in its approach to the boundary questions, and the Russian aircraft
enabled the Indians to implement the forward policy, thereby helping India
on the way to disaster.

The Sino-Russian borders were the products of the Imperial Russian’s
drive for territory and China’s weakness during the nineteenth century.
In the middle of nineteenth century, Russians annexed all of China’s territory
north of the Amur River, and was grinding into China in central Asia, pushing
back the frontier of Chinese Tukestan (Sinkiang). In 1911, at the establishment
of the Republic of China, the Chinese nationalists began demanding the
abrogation of the "unequal treaties" and restoration of former frontiers.
In 1917, Commissar for Foreign Affairs declared that the Soviet Government
repudiated all unequal treaties. The Karakhan manifesto confirmed in 1920
that "The Government of the … Soviet Republic declares as void all the
treaties concluded by the former Government of Russia with China, renounces
all the annexations of Chinese territory, all the concessions in China
and returns to China free of charge and forever all that was ravenously
taken from her by the Tsar’s Government and by the Russian bourgeoisie."
But the Soviet Government very soon came to the view that, unequal treaties
or not, the Sino-Russian boundaries should stay where they were. The Chinese
were prepared to accept the boundaries and to regard the lost territories
as gone for good, despite of bitter resentment of the injustice over the
"unequal treaties" and national humiliations. In 1960, the Chinese Government
proposed to Moscow to negotiate the boundary settlements. In 1964, when
the negotiations began, the Soviet Union adopted exactly the same approach
to the boundary question as had India: "There is nothing to discuss except
what we agree to discuss," and was as unacceptable as the Indian approach.
Like Nehru, the Russian were willing, indeed eager, to settle with China
on minor boundary rectifications, but refused to enter into general boundary
negotiations. As the Chinese made explicitly clear that they were prepared
to accept the old treaties, the Russians played deaf as did the Indians.
It was probable that the Russian and Indian perceived the Chinese insistence
on equality at the negotiation table as a challenge.

As the Sino-Soviet quarrel intensified through 1960, the Russian support
of India became a key charge in China’s ideological denunciation of Krushchev’s
"revisionism." China viewed the Tibetan revolt marked Nehru’s swerve to
the Right. Now the national bourgeois Government of India entered second
phase, in which the workers, peasants, and intellectuals began their struggle
against the bourgeoisie, Nehru Government manufactured a frontier dispute
with China in order to postpone the day of reckoning. In the autumn of
1960, Russia opened a new and deeply provocative chapter by providing a
major military assistance to India, including Anthnov-12 heavy transport
aircraft and then "Hound" helicopter suited to operate at 16-17,000 feet
altitudes in Ladakh. Against vigorous protests of the British and American
Governments, the Indians purchased MiG jet fighters from Russia. In the
autumn of 1961, when the Indian military activity increased in the western
sector as purposeful and coordinated, China recognized the Indian "attempt
to realize territorial claims unilaterally and by force." In the middle
of 1962, the People’s Daily warned that it would be "very erroneous and
dangerous should the Indian Government take China’s attitude of restraint
and tolerance as an expression of weakness." The Indians "mistook China’s
long forbearance as a sign that China was weak and could be bullied. They
thought that with the backing of the imperialists and support of the Soviet
leaders they had nothing to fear, and that as soon as they took action
China would be forced to retreat and their territorial claims would be
realized." The alternative became clear. China could either agree to withdraw
from the disputed territory and surrender to India’s diplomatic and military
pressure at the cost of national pride and prestige as well as strategic
position in the Tibet-Sinkiang region, or China could take up the Indian
challenge and fight.

Like the Russians, China wished to avoid major, especially nuclear,
wars, but they could not truckle to the imperialists. As Mao Tse-tung put
it, the "US imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek clique" must not be overestimated
as they were "rotten to the core and had no future," and therefore can
be slighted in the strategic context. "But in regard to any particular
situation or specific struggle … we must never slight the enemy: on the
contrary, we can win victory only when we take full account of him and
devote all our energies to the fight." In 1929, after a dispute over the
Chinese Eastern Railway, the Kuomintang Government of China attacked the
Russian border. The Soviet Union invaded Manchuria, destroyed a Kuomintang
army, and withdrew to its own territory. China now considered this, "compelled
to act in self-defense," a perfectly right thing to do. The resolute Russian
counterblow defended the national interests of the Soviet Union, and also
"accorded with the interests of the Chinese people and of the revolutionary
people of the world." With this thinking, China warned in September 1962,
as the Indians determinedly pressed forward: "If the Indian side should
insist on threatening by armed force the Chinese defense forces who are
duty-bound to defend their territory, and thereby arouse their resistance,
it must bear the responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom."

Part
IV: The Border War

(i)
The Ridge and the River

In the summer of 1962, the public attention in India was focused on
the western sector of the borders. The Indian Government reversed the actuality
and propagated the belief that it was China that was deliberately pushing
forward in order to expand. While pursuing a policy of utmost recklessness,
the Government successfully obscured the facts to the outside world as
well as to the Indian mass that increasingly complained of the inability
to challenge China with boldness and determination. Nehru had deprived
himself of all options, as suspending the forward policy would be construed
as surrender and betrayal of the national cause. Since Nehru had misled
the nation into the belief that the Indian Army was strong enough to handle
the Chinese, he had no choice but to rely on the military force to counteract
the Chinese. While the forward policy was being implemented in the western
sector, the border war was triggered by a marginal Indian move forward
in the eastern sector, where the Chinese observed the McMahon Line as the
de facto boundary.

After the Longju incident in August 1959, the eastern sector had been
quiet as Nehru and Chou En-lai agreed to suspend patrol along the McMahon
Line on both sides. The forward policy reversed the orders and made the
McMahon Line a live border again. In December 1961, Eastern Command was
ordered to move forward to the closest practicable posts to the McMahon
Line. To reach the Line, it took weeks of trekking, and supplying became
an acute problem, often placing the remote garrisons in real danger of
starvation. As the senior officers pointed out the impracticability of
posting troops, unlike the western sector, their representations were brushed
aside. In February 1962, General Kaul went to Assam to personally deal
with the protests, and in the first half of 1962, the Army set up twenty-four
posts along the McMahon Line. On the eastern sector, the Chinese did not
counteract so long as the Indians kept to their own side of the McMahon
Line. As the exact alignment of Longju was disputed, the Indians did not
reoccupy it in 1962. However, the Indians set off the border war by establishing
a new post at the disputed territory at the western extremity of the McMahon
Line. The Line terminated on the boundary with Bhutan at the latitude of
27^o44'30''N on the map signed by the British and the Tibetans
in New Delhi on March 24, 1914. When the Line was transported to the coordinates
to the ground, it did not lie along the highest ridge in the vicinity,
which in fact lied three to four miles north of where McMahon drew the
line,
at Thag La ridge.

Since August of 1959, the Indians set up a post north of the McMahon
Line at Khinzemane, by which Indians claimed to and moved into an area
of about twenty-five square miles north of the map-marked McMahon Line.
This brought instant Chinese reaction. About two hundred Chinese came,
as Nehru said later, "physically pushing back" the ten or twelve men of
the Assam Rifles a couple of miles in the direction where they came from.
But two days later, the Indians returned to Khinzemane and said they would
resist to the Chinese who tried to push they back again. The Chinese acquiesced.
New Delhi protested to Peking on August 11, claiming that Khinzemane was
in Indian territory and that Thag La ridge was the boundary "traditionally
as well as by treaty map." India referred "tradition" to the seasonal grazing
practiced by the herdsmen from a southern village, but the villagers from
the north used the area the same way. The claim of the treaty map was false
as neither Thag La ridge nor Khinzemane was identified on the map. China
protested too, claiming that Khinzemane was "undoubtedly part of Chinese
territory" and that India made "serious encroachments upon China’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity," warning India of serious consequences if the
Indians post were not withdrawn. India modified a proposal requesting China
to leave the status quo at Khinzemane undisturbed, while India would undertake
no further change, "pending further discussions." China did not follow
up the threat of "serious consequences," and the Indian post at Khinzemane
was unmolested for the next three years, until India broke its implicit
undertaking by setting up another post in the area.

In May 1962, the ban on patrolling to the west of Khinzemane was lifted
and XXXIII Corps was ordered to set up several posts, including one at
the trijunction of India, China and Bhutan. The platoon patrol of Assam
Rifles, which were under control of the civilian arm through the governor
of Assam, disregarded the McMahon Line and treated the Thag La ridge as
the boundary. They set up a post there on June 4, overlooking the sizeable
Tibetan village of Le, but there was no sign of the Chinese who still observed
the 1959 no patrol agreement. Then the Corps recommended to establish Dhola
Post in the Khinzemane area, which the Ministry of External Affairs approved
and marked the point of no return. The eastern sector remained quiet until
September 8, when the Chinese treated Dhola Post the same as they did to
the Indian forward posts in the west. About sixty Chinese suddenly appeared
down Thag La ridge and pressed close to the post. The Indian commander
in the post exaggerated the number to six hundred, with the hope of bringing
the Army to his assistance, calculating that if he reported a realistic
figure, his own small force would be left to handle the situation. But
the Chinese did not surround or attack Dhola Post. They settled into nearby
positions and dominated the post. On September 16, China followed diplomatic
protest that Indians were intruding further and "reveal how ambitious the
Indian side’s aggressive designs are … also show that the Indian side is
actively extending the tension to the entire Sino-Indian boundary," warning
that India would be responsible for all the consequences.

In the Anglo-Tibetan agreement of March 1914, there were no verbal descriptions
of the boundary and the location of the line, which was to be determined
only by reading off and transposing the longitude and latitude from the
original treaty map to the ground. This would plainly leave Dhola Post
and Thag La ridge, like Khinzemane, north of the McMahon Line and in Chinese
territory. However, the Indian Government insisted that McMahon intended
to run the boundary along the lines of high ridges and, since Thag La ridge
was the dominant feature, the boundary must lie along Thag La ridge. In
Indian views, Thag La ridge had become a definitive and absolute boundary,
and Dhola Post belonged to India as indisputably as New Delhi to itself.
Based on its clear logic, India pushed the forward policy one explosive
stage further. It was first thought that Indian patrols would infiltrate
into Chinese-occupied territory and China would not retaliate. Then the
Indian posts would cut off Chinese posts and force them to withdraw, and
China would not retaliate. And now Indians would attack and force the Chinese
back and China would not attack. The Indian Government built up the public
confidence and expectation such that any marginal incursions by the Chinese
on the McMahon Line, which was clearly and absolutely the boundary, would
not be tolerated. It was further believed that the disadvantages were all
on China’s side and the Indian Army was well placed to defend the border,
while the truth was reverse. The road construction made movement relatively
easy for the Chinese, whose troops had been stationed in Tibet for years,
physically attuned and acclimatized to the high altitude as well as suitably
clothed and equipped. On the Indian side, lateral movement was extremely
difficult as the valleys lay north to south and the constant landslides
and washouts during the monsoon made it unaffordable to cut roads. The
Indians were disadvantaged throughout NEFA. As the Chinese road led to
a point three hours, it took six days’ march for the Indians to reach Tawang.
By the time Indian troops reached Tawang, they were exhausted and often
sick with pulmonary edema, due to lack of acclimatization to and sudden
exertion at high altitude. By as late as October 1962, Nehru still informed
the journalists that the advantage lay with India in NEFA, and by September
1962, the belief had become an accepted truth in India.

Despite of public pressure, the Indian Government did not have to be
pushed into actions. On September 9, a meeting was held in the Defense
Ministry, which decided that the Chinese must be evicted immediately. As
Nehru left for a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in London the
day before, the meeting was conducted by Menon, who like other ministers,
followed Nehru’s style of decision making without consulting the Cabinet.
Although Menon initially did not favor the forward policy and inclined
towards a negotiated boundary settlement with China, after failing to convince
Nehru, now he took a strong and public line to eject the Chinese from Thag
La ridge. The officers at the Defense Ministry meeting raised the issue
that Dhola Post was in Chinese territory in their own maps, but they were
told to disregard the maps and treat the crest of Thag La ridge as the
boundary. General Thapar accepted the eviction order, which was code-named
Leghorn, and XXXIII Corps was to move to Dhola Post immediately, without
considering the difficulties in supplying the troops in an extremely difficult
and little-known country. The military and civilian leadership, the latter
with overriding command over the former, took unprofessional, overoptimistic
and even irrational view of the military possibilities. On September 12,
General Singh, of XXXIII Corps assured his superior officers of his determination
to take actions, but suggested that Dhola Post should simply be withdrawn
because of the limitations of his troops. The Chinese could quickly build
up to divisional strength north of Tawang, and would outbid any Indian
reinforcements in Thag La ridge. The Indian troops would have to rely on
air supply, and also need heavy winter clothing and tents. General Sen
of the Eastern Command personally went to Singh and other officers repeating
the order to throw back the Chinese over Thag La ridge. On September 14,
9 Punjab battalion marched out for Dhola Post, with about four hundred
rifles, half of the full complement of eight hundred. The second battalion
of the brigade was ordered to move within forty-eight hours to Dhola Post,
which was also at half strength.

By September 14, Army Head Quarter (H.Q.) learned the actual number
of Chinese below Thag La ridge was only fifty or sixty, the true information
that would unlikely have brought forth so drastic of reaction. But Army
H.Q. did not call off the eviction move, but ordered the Punjabis to capture
Thag La by September 19, but the order did not reached the Punjabis until
September 19 itself. The Punjabis reached the Namka Chu early on September
15, still two full days of march away from Dhola Post, moving on hard scale
rations and pouch ammunitions aside from heavy weapons and mortar ammunition.
The Punjabis encountered the Chinese in company strength on both sides
of the river that was forced by the monsoon rains. The Chinese reportedly
"shouted in Hindi that the Indians should withdraw from the Namka Chu area
as it was Chinese territory. They said that the Indian and Chinese peoples
had an unbreakable friendship and this friendship should not be marred
by petty border incidents. … They asked (the Indians) to send (their) local
civil officers to discuss the exact location of the border." In response,
the Indian political officer was ordered not to have discussions with the
Chinese. The commanding officer of the Punjabis spread the battalion out
along the Namka Chu in order to relieve Dhola Post, reopen the supply route
and prevent Chinese incursion. Since September 13, Brigadier Dalvi, who
was a forty-two-year-old graduate of the Indian Military Academy, had been
ordered to move from Tawang to the Namka Chu. As the Indians laboriously
built up force on the Namka Chu, the Chinese on the other side of the river
kept pace with them effortlessly.

The Indian military intelligence (M.I.) declined during the last days
of the British. There were no Indians in M.I. after 1947, and the civilian
Intelligence Bureau (I.B.) replaced its role. Policy officers staffed the
I.B., and a former officer Malik headed the Bureau and had an important
place in the innermost counsels of the government. By 1960s Malik was widely
accepted in domestic politics, especially his predictions about Chinese
behavior. The forward policy was based on the rock solid faith established
upon his appreciation, or rather divination, that the Chinese would not
retaliate, even if India used force against the Chinese. Malik relied on
extra-sensory perceptions, and helped to close the ears of Nehru and his
official advisers, despite of mounting reports of increasing Chinese troops
behind the McMahon Line. Nehru and his colleagues wished to believe that
Chinese could be forced back without trouble. When a news agency reported
of this on September 10, the Government tried to persuade the agency to
withdraw it and then report that it was unfounded. When spokesman confirmed
on September 13 that "some Chinese forces have appeared in the area of
the Bhutan trijunction…" there was unwillingness to say squarely that Chinese
troops deliberately crossed the McMahon Line. The spokesman simply said
on September 14, "A Chinese group appears to be on our side." The Government
leaked news constantly and most secret decisions appear in the press at
extraordinary speed. The official attempt to suppress reports of Thag La
ridge was thus unsuccessful, and the domestic critics obliged the Government
to expel the Chinese instantly even if single Chinese crossed the McMahon
Line, let alone Chinese forced across the line. The public, including the
Congress, was outraged at the universally believed new Chinese aggression,
unprovoked and insolent. The Swatantra Party called for Nehru’s resignation
for the "utter failure to protect India’s borders," and the demands increased
over the Government to issue an ultimatum to China, as impatience grew
with the Government’s countermeasures.

General Singh at XXXIII Corps were reluctant to put troops where they
could not be supplied and to launch an operation that was militarily impossible.
The Chief of General Staff, General Thapar, expressed in a meeting in the
Defense Ministry on September 22 that China would retaliate in the western
sector and perhaps against all forward Indians posts east of the Chinese
claim line. But a stock civilian reassurance overrode the concern. The
Defense Ministry and External Affairs calculated to give a hard and demonstrative
blow at the Chinese beneath Thag La ridge so that Chinese would retreat
there but also would take a much more acquiescent line elsewhere. This
was derived from reading the mood and character of the Chinese Government
and confirmed by Malik’s estimations that no one would risk to assault
a country as identified as India with the cause of peace. General Thapar’s
warning was thus rejected in the Defense Ministry and the order for the
Army was confirmed to evict the Chinese. General Thapar requested the order
be put in writing, which came from a junior official who consulted through
telephone call to the Defense Minister Menon in New York without consulting
the Cabinet Defense Committee. The order overruled General Thapar’s professional
judgment that his force was incapable of handling the Chinese reaction
to the eviction operation. Three years before, Thapar’s predecessor Thimayya
submitted resignation after having had a clash with Menon, and was humiliated
and humbled under the name of "civil supremacy." This marked a point of
no return in the Indian Army, and Thapar failed to offer his resignation.
Brigadier Dalvi, much lower in rank, finally submitted resignation in protest
and wrote later: "Resignation is the last constitutional resort of a service
chief in a democratic set up … this is the only safeguard against incompetent,
unscrupulous or ambitious politicians."

With the confirmation and passing down of the order, implementation
was faced with daunting problems. The Indians were under far more strongly
armed Chinese troops who outnumbered them by five or ten to one. The Namka
Chu was still difficult to access and supply the troops. Rations of thirty
days had to be air-dropped and stocked as well as field guns and ammunition.
By the end of September, the politicians in New Delhi, including those
in the Government, Congress Party and Opposition, were getting impatient
with the Army "to take the steps necessary to clear the Chinese from Indian
territory across Thag la ridge." The news media and official comments expressed
confidence and optimism to achieve the Indian objectives without difficulty.
In contrast to the impatience, the Namka Chu was quiet in the first part
of September, as the Chinese offered cigarettes to the tobacco-less Indians
and even handled over parachuted Indian supplies that landed on their side.
On September 17, the Chinese reported that: "While two Chinese frontier
guards were on sentry duty … more than sixty Indian soldiers closed in
on them from three direction. The two Chinese soldiers immediately shouted
to the Indian soldiers to halt. But the Indian troops pressed forward even
faster. Several of the Indian troops gathered round them at a distance
of about ten meters and some came as close as three meters to one of the
guards, aiming their British-made rifles and Canadian-made sub-machine-guns
and howling out at the top of their voices in wanton provocation." On September
20, the first shooting occurred, leaving two Chinese dead and five Indians
wounded. Peking protested and demanded that "the Indian side immediately
stop its attack and withdraw," warning that the Chinese would fire back
in defense. The People’s Daily wrote: "the situation is most critical and
the consequences will be serious. Let the Indian authorities not say that
warning has not been served in advance." The Indians counter protested
in almost the same language, calling China to "cease aggressive activities
on Indian territory" and withdraw or "be responsible for all the consequences."
Both sides were saber-rattling, but India’s scabbard was empty.

The official Indian accounts of exchanges of fire below Thag La ridge
blamed the Chinese for having provoked them. This pressed the journalists
and politicians to blame the field commanders as sluggish, and specifically
pointed the blame on General Singh. When General Singh went to Eastern
Command on September 29, General Sen refused to accept Singh’s requirement
as impossible to meet. Singh wrote to protest both the impracticability
of the operation that he was ordered to launch and the impropriety of Sen’s
handling of the situation. Sen presented the written protest as an example
of uncooperativeness and on October 2, both Thapar and Sen asked Menon
to remove Singh from commanding XXXIII Corps, to which Menon agreed. The
difficulties in finding a replacement made them decide to not simply remove
Singh but to form XXXIII Corps into another corps to take over operations
on the northwestern border. On October 3, it was decided that the new IV
Corps should be headed by Kaul and would be made responsible for immediate
launching of Operation Leghorn. Despite that Kaul had never commanded troops
in combat, Nehru and Menon regarded Kaul as savior and were convinced that
China would not strike back and the operation would be a straightforward
one. The delusion was fused such that the operation would speedily succeed
only if the right man commanded the troops. When Thapar repeated the possibility
of Chinese counterblows, according to Kaul, Nehru replied that he had "good
reason to believe that the Chinese would not take any strong action against
us." As Kaul went to see Nehru prior to his appointment to command IV Corps,
Nehru expressed that "the Chinese would see reason and withdraw from Dhola
but in case they did not, we would have no option but to expel them from
our territory. If we failed to take such action, Government would forfeit
public confidence completely."

While the tension was building up on the border, the last rally of diplomatic
exchanges was played out. In August the Indians expressed to China that
they would be glad to discuss joint withdrawal from the disputed territory
in the western sector. By "joint withdrawal", the Indians meant that China
withdrew from all of the territory India claimed and India withdrew only
the forward posts recently established in the western sector. After the
completion of those withdrawals, India would proceed to talks with only
minor adjustments of the "international boundaries," i.e., the Indian claimed
lines. China replied on September 13, and accused India of seeking "excuses
for rejecting discussions," pointing to the continuing Indians military
activities in the western sector as "sham negotiations and real fighting."
China would welcome seriously intended negotiations, but would "resist
whenever attacked." China then reiterated the proposal put forward by Chou
En-lai in November 1959 that the armed forces each withdraw twenty kilometers
and urged further discussions first in Peking on October 15 and then in
Delhi alternatively. On September 19, New Delhi agreed to talks in Peking
as proposed but only based on Indian demands. "The Government of India
are prepared to hold further discussions at the appropriate level to define
measures to restore the status quo in the Western Sector which has been
altered by force in the last few years and to remove the current tensions
in that area." India would arrange talks with Peking on October 15 when
China had indicated acceptance of that Indian formulation. By this time
India refused to discuss the eastern sector at all, having the Punjabis
set up along the Namka Chu. China replied on October 3, when the situation
along the Namka Chu had become as tense as that in the western sector.
Peking dismissed the Indian demand as absolutely unacceptable that "China
must withdraw from vast tracts of her territory before discussions on the
Sino-Indian boundary question can start." The Chinese expressed that they
were against any preconditions set up to talks, and proposed that the October
15 talk proceed in Peking to discuss any aspect of the boundary question.
But India replied on October 6, explicitly and categorically refusing to
discuss while blaming China for preventing the talks. India retracted its
earlier agreement to open discussions, and declared that it would "not
enter into any talks and discussion under duress or continued threat of
force." India insisted that it would talk only after China withdraw from
Thag La and explicitly acknowledged that the talks concern only mutual
withdraw in the western sector. China described this as "finally categorically
shut(ting) the door to negotiations." As usual, most onlookers accepted
the Indian accusation of China that "it is the Government of China who
are not only refusing to undertake talks and discussions… but are creating
further tension and conflict… in the eastern sector." Nehru had also to
the last maintained that "I shall always be prepared for talks, whatever
may happen, provided that the other side is decent, and it is self-respecting
for us. I have never refused to talk to anyone."

As Kaul left, the newspapers in New Delhi reported with headlines "special
task force created to oust Chinese" and "Gen. Kaul leaves for NEFA to assume
command" as the "Indian Army poised for all-out effort." The Times of India
described Kaul as "a soldier of extraordinary courage and drive" to lead
the "task force," ignoring that the news of his appointment and the formation
of new corps should be of highest military secret. The Defense Ministry
did nothing to diminish the optimistic expectations that the Army would
soon drive the Chinese out of NEFA. On October 4, General Sen met Kaul
and his handpicked officers at Tezpur airport. Although Sen was formally
superior, but since Nehru charged Kaul himself, Kaul was the Supreme and
he notified the Army H.Q. that he was taking command. Kaul’s task was to
command 7 Brigade, complete the operation, and return to his job in New
Delhi. After flying to visit military stations, Kaul reported on October
6 to Army H.Q. of heavy Chinese build-up below Thag La ridge, with artillery,
heavy mortars, and medium machine-guns, "apart from other dangerous weapons
they possess such as recoilless guns and automatic rifles." The Operation
Leghorn was to be launched on October 10, and Kaul was "taking every possible
step to outwit the enemy and capture our objective." After warning the
possibility that the Chinese might overrun the Indian forces, Kaul proposed
that Air Force should be alerted to be quickly deployed and to retrieve
the situation.

Kaul reached Dhola Post on the afternoon of October 7, and spent the
rest of the day studying the ground, which presented discouraging difficulties
on the Indians side with deep and fast-flowing Namka Chu. The Chinese dominated
the Indian positions and lines of communications, and had prepared strong
bunks and cleared timbers with infantry and equipment, taunting the Indian
troops who tried to cut logs with entrenching tools and shovels. On the
evening, Kaul sent another message to New Delhi, bypassing the regular
channel through Army H.Q., in an immensely lengthy report, which were chatty
and descriptive, more like a letter to a fond uncle at home than military
signals. It took eight hours to transmit the lengthy message which described
the difficulties confronting the Indian forces, including the strength
of the Chinese, desperate supply position, lack of ammunition and rations,
and lack of winter clothing as two of the three battalions were still in
summer uniforms. "I must point out … the Chinese are bound to put in a
strong counterattack … to dislodge us from the positions we capture. I
have no resources with which to meet this threat and therefore recommend
… all military and air resources are marshaled now for restoration of position
in our favor." Kaul’s faith that the Chinese would fight back came under
great strain and could no longer take the strength of the Chinese positions,
the power of their weapons, and their easy reinforcements as exaggerated
report by officers who did not have stomach for battle. "Despite all these
difficulties," Kaul decided to proceed with Operation Leghorn and to order
the more heavily armed 7 Brigade into an attack.

On October 7, Kaul received a report from Army H.Q. that was sent from
the Indian Consul General in Lhasa. The report informed, without comment,
that heavy mortars and artillery in divisional strength were concentrating
on the Chinese side of the McMahon Line behind Thag La, and that the troops
talked of an attack on Tawang. On October 8, Kaul began the opening moves
in Operation Leghorn, and on October 9, he disclosed his intentions to
officers that there was no option but to carryout the operation on October
10 as it was the last acceptable date to the Cabinet. He then ordered the
Rajputs to move next day to Yumtso La pass at 16,000 feet on the west of
Thag La, who were to take up positions behind and dominate the Chinese.
This order came as unbelievable to the officers as they all knew the conditions
of the Indian troops and the great strength of the Chinese positions. The
Chinese were bound to respond violently to the move as they have warned
repeatedly that they would not allow any Indians across the river. Kaul
dismissed the demurrals of Brigadier Dalvi and General Prasad who pointed
out that the Indian troops could not survive at 16,000 feet without winter
clothing and could not be supplied, and that they could be slaughtered
on the way without covering artillery. Instead, he ordered a patrol of
some fifty Punjabis who crossed the river on October 9 and reached Tseng-jong
before dusk, without being interfered or attacked by the Chinese. This
put Kaul on high spirit, who had just received a signal from Thapar affirming
the Government’s faith in him and those who warned of the Chinese reaction
felt like "bloody fools" as Prasad put it. Kaul sent another long signal
describing the manifold disadvantages of his forces and reporting that
his "bold and speedy tactics" took the enemy by surprise and had in fact
already occupied the crest.

As the Rajputs grouped and moved towards the Yumtso La pass on October
10, Kaul kept to deadline. But the Chinese reacted, shattering the eviction
plan and the premise upon which the forward policy was constructed and
border dispute was handled. Kaul described "when I was getting ready and
my batman was boiling water for tea…. I heard considerable fire from across
the river." A full battalion of Chinese quickly moved down the ridge and
formed up for an attack on Tseng-jong, where the Indian position came under
heavy mortar fire. The Chinese troops outnumbered the Indians by nearly
twenty to one, with the smashing mortar barrage, Dalvi exclaimed to Kaul:
"Oh my God, you’re right, they mean business." Kaul handed control over
to Dalvi and decided to personally apprise Nehru of the situation and set
off down the Namka Chu for New Delhi. Meanwhile he ordered that the eviction
operation should be suspended and the brigade should hold its positions
along the Namka Chu and at Tsangle. The first Chinese assault on the Indians
at Tseng-jong were beaten off. The Chinese came under enfilade fire and
suffered heavy casualties, being unaware of the section covering the Tseng-jong
position from the flank. The Punjabis commander asked for covering fire
from the mortars and machine-guns. Dalvi refused, unable to risk the whole
force to be wiped out. Dalvi ordered the Punjabis to disengage and retreat
to the river. The Chinese held their fires and let the Indian survivors
to cross the bridge to the south bank. Indian casualties were seven killed,
seven missing, and eleven wounded, whereas the Chinese reported thirty-three
killed and wounded. The Chinese buried the Indian dead with full military
honors as watched by their comrades across the river line.

Kaul reported to New Delhi of the grave situation and requested permission
to return to give firsthand account of the "new and sudden development"
before Nehru left for Ceylon on October 12. The little battle of Tseng-jong,
in which the Chinese fought with massive force and determination, was grave
for the Indians as it belied the conviction that was at the heart of the
forward policy, that the Chinese would never deliberately and determinedly
attack Indians. Kaul was now, like many of the troops, suffering from a
pulmonary disorder as a result of lack of acclimatization to high altitude.
As he return to New Delhi on October 11, a fullest conference on the border
crisis was held. But despite of the dangerous crisis that India faced,
Nehru still did not bring the Cabinet or the Cabinet Defense Committee
for consultation. Kaul opened the meeting, reporting the battle in all
graphic and subjective accounts. When asked for recommendation, Kaul did
not urge to withdraw 7 Brigade, but proposed to seek speedy and copious
military assistance from the United States, which Nehru dismissed with
some irritation. Kaul then suggested postponing the eviction operation
and then pulling 7 Brigade back to better tactical positions, but other
participants contradicted. A consensus appeared that eviction operation
had to be postponed, but no clear instructions were issued. Thapar and
Sen intended to keep their troops at the present position, while Kaul planned
to cancel the attack order but keeping the brigade on the river line. Operation
Leghorn committed too many reputations in civilian and service sides now
to be demonstratively abandoned. Nehru announced that it was a decision
that soldiers need to make and asked that their views and advice be given
to the Government. Nehru’s military advisers gave him what he wished to
hear, with assurance, that China would not "do anything big". The mutual
delusion led the October 11 meeting to decide that 7 Brigade should stay
at its present location.

The next morning, as Nehru left for the three-day visit to Ceylon, he
gave his usually accessible briefing to the press prior to boarding the
plane. During the past month, as the Government gave orders to force the
Chinese out of the McMahon Line, there were always suggestions that Indian
troops were beating off Chinese attacks. When asked what orders were given
to the troops in NEFA, Nehru replied that "our instructions are to free
our territory" and, when asked for a timeline, "I cannot fix a date, that
is entirely for the Army." He then "pointed out that wintry conditions
had set in already in the (Thag La) region, and the Chinese were strongly
positioned because they were in large numbers and were situated on higher
ground." When the correspondents sought assurances that the Government
had no intention of having talks, Nehru said: "As long as this particular
aggression lasts, there appears to be no chance of talks." After the debacle,
Nehru was criticized for deliberately misleading the country with this
public confirmation of the eviction order, which had been suspended because
the operation was beyond the capability of the Indian troops. Nehru later
defended himself: "It was the viewpoint of the military people too, they
wanted to do it, otherwise I would not have dared to say anything like
that." Nehru emphasized that he tried to give warnings about wintry conditions
and the Chinese advantages. However, if Nehru intended to warn the public,
the public was not listening. Official spokesmen had long been giving assurances
that everything in NEFA was under control, and even Nehru himself was convinced
that the physical advantages were all on India’s side in NEFA. The press
was enthusiastic of Nehru’s statement in the airport. "Mr. Nehru has told
the country, clearly and firmly, what it has been waiting to hear, that
the armed forces have been ordered to throw the Chinese aggressors out
of NEFA and that until Indian territory in that area is cleared of them
there can be no talks with China."

Encouraged by the Goa operation, the public was so confident in the
prowess and invincibility of the Army that it demanded for hasty actions.
A New Delhi editor with good official contacts revealed that the Chinese
below Thag La ridge were "third-rate garrison troops" who would present
no problems once the attack began. This information was presumed to originate
in Malik’s crystal ball in the Intelligence Bureau. Dalvi said of his first
contact with the Chinese: "I must admit I was impressed with the Chinese
soldiers. Those were no scruffy Frontier Guards; they appeared to be healthy,
well-clad, well-armed and determined troops." However, the universal impression
in India was that the Indian troops were strong, properly equipped and
confident task force who was held back from surging over the inferior Chinese
force only by the excessive forbearance or timidity of the Indian Government.
Nehru’s airport statement slipped the least leash and the Indian public
began to await victorious news from their troops in Thag La. China also
draw a similar conclusion, as the People’s Daily wrote: "Prime Minister
Nehru has openly and formally authorized the Indian military to attack
China’s Tibet region at any time," and "a massive invasion of Chinese territory
by Indian troops in the eastern sector of the Chinese boundary seems imminent."
The Chinese then advised Nehru: "Pull back from the brink of the precipice,
and don’t use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble."

The Chinese looked down from strong bunkers on Thag La ridge, in their
comfortable thick padded uniforms and confidence in their numbers and weapons,
at the unfortunate hungry and cold Indian troops on the river line. China
had no reason whatsoever to fear an Indian attack, but had every reason
to expect it. Chinese intelligence learned of October 10 Operation Leghorn,
and on October 8 the Soviet informed the Foreign Ministry in Peking that
India was on the point of launching a major attack. Krushchev told the
Chinese Ambassador in Moscow later that it was natural for China to fight
back if it were attacked. The Chinese remarked that the Russian helicopters
and transport aircraft that helped India to prepare the offensive did not
help the Sino-Russian goodwill among the Chinese frontier guards. For months,
India ignored all China’s warnings of retaliation, but probed forward in
the western sector and applied exactly the same tactics to take over territory
north of the McMahon Line. After heavy Chinese casualties on the first
Indian attempt at Tseng-jong on October 10, the Indians had learned no
lesson but intended to mount further attacks as soon as they were ready.
Nehru’s words were not bluff and confirmed that Indian troops at Namka
Chu were deployed for assault and indeed were being reinforced. China did
not have many options. China could continue trying to persuade India to
settle the boundary through negotiation and to convince other governments
that the Chinese position was reasonable and that if conflict broke out
on the boundaries, it was the result of India’s behavior. But by now this
policy did not seem worth while. Enjoying its higher credibility, India
continued skirmishing along the Sino-Indian boundaries while accusing China
of provoking clashes and committing aggression. The Western countries were
solidly with India, the Soviet Union was in sympathy with India as were
most of the fraternal parties, and many afro-Asian countries also leaned
toward India’s side. Prolongation of the situation on the boundary was
militarily injurious to China as well. It would require troops to be in
a state of readiness for battle, and also complicating the problem of pacifying
Tibet. By October 1962, the alternative was clear: meet the Indian challenge
with a counterblow so powerful and resolute as to end it.

The political objective of the Chinese military action was to bring
India to the negotiating table, and to demonstrate to India and to the
world the fallacy of their assumptions. The western formulations, especially
popular in the U.S. was that China was going to "humble India and to seize
the leadership of Asia," or to "put a brake on India’s development by forcing
her to build up militarily." These assumptions were uncharacteristic and
unlikely, as the Chinese leaders would never for a moment have supposed
that any country but China could ever aspire to the leadership of Asia,
and that India, with its capitalist system and national bourgeois government,
could challenge China in a race to development. This idea must have been
absurd to Peking’s Communist purists even in 1962 when China had economic
difficulties after the Great Leap Forward failed. But Indians, especially
Nehru, who thought of China as equal of China or superior, suggested that
war between India and China would shake the world, but neither would "knock
the other flat." Furthermore, the Sino-Indian dispute contributed much
to China’s great falling-out with the Soviet Union. A blow at India would
expose the covert Indian alliance with the Americans and the ideological
error of Moscow’s support for India. Such a blow must be on a grand scale,
as wiping out the forty or some small Indian posts might achieve nothing
but bringing in continued disturbances from the Indians when they felt
able and start moving forward again. The real provocation for China was
in the west, but the military and political opportunity for demonstrative
and destructive retaliation was in the east in a strong move into the disputed
territory beneath the McMahon Line. From the beginning of October, the
Chinese Army was concentrating behind the McMahon Line, and by October
17, the Chinese troops on Thag La ridge began active preparations for the
actual assault.

The meeting on October 11 left no definite decision and created confusions
and contradictions that followed. Kaul returned to his headquarters on
October 13 and informed his subordinates that he failed to persuade the
Government and that the eviction order must be carried out. General Thapar
though appeared to have understood that Leghorn was to be postponed. Argument
and uncertainty followed the next nine days. Menon, Kaul, and the General
Staff still hoped that the Chinese could be thrown back and were determined
not to withdraw from the Namka Chu. On October 14, Menon made his commitment
to evict the Chinese more clearer than Nehru, by declaring that it was
"the policy of the Government of India to eject the Chinese from NEFA,
whether it takes one day, a hundred days or a thousand days," and to fight
it out in Ladakh "to the last man, the last gun." All were aware that withdrawal
from the Namka Chu would instantly become public knowledge and Menon would
be the first to take the public disappointment. Thus those in the back
were crying "Forward!" and those in the front were crying "Back!" Brigadier
Dalvi and General Prasad were reinforced on the Namka Chu with another
battalion between October 12 and 14, who were as unacclimatized and exhausted
and with poor equipment as the others battalions. The Indians had about
3,000 men, about 2,500 of them troops. As the first snow fell on October
17, winter clothing and tends were only available to two or three hundred,
and the rest still wore cotton summer uniforms and made shelters with branches
or parachute material. The gunners who were brought over to march on 16,000-foot
route suffered fatal casualties due to lack of acclimatization and cold.
Since October 9, the troops had been on hard rations, of which reserve
now was down to two days, with no sugar, salt or matches. Many airdrops
were lost or smashed as the parachutes failed to open. To conserve foreign
exchange, the Army had for years been returning used parachutes for repair
and repacking in India. Only thirty percent of the loads dropped were being
retrieved.

It has become a political ploy, not a war. It was absurd or criminal
to pit troops in such circumstances against an enemy superior in every
aspect of military strength. To leave them through a winter of heavy snow
would lead them to illness and starvation. On October 12, 7 Brigade received
a signal from Kaul confirming the troops to stay where they were. On the
same day Nehru confirmed on a radio broadcast that they were to clear the
Chinese off Thag La ridge. On October 16, the Defense Minister told Dalvi
that November 1 was the last date acceptable to the Cabinet to complete
the operation. The key staff officers at IV Corps extended emphatic support
for the field officers to pull back the bulk of the brigade. Brigadier
Singh suggested that the force on the Namka Chu should be formed to one
battalion and should concentrate in tactical positions to support Dhola
Post, a suggestion almost exactly the same as what General Singh recommended
six weeks before. In the debate, Tsangle became a central question, which
was marked by a herdsman’s hut at the source of Namka Chu in a small lake.
The Army map marked it as two to three miles from Dhola Post but in fact
it was two days’ march away. Survey maps placed it within Bhutan, but the
Indian Army was ordered to disregard that boundary, as it did to the McMahon
Line. Tsangle provided a tactical position from which a flank attack can
be made against the Chinese position beneath Thag La, and Brigadier Dalvi
had planned to advance to Tseng-jong through Tsangle. General Singh backed
Dalvi and urged not to move to Tsangle before the operation actually began
in order to take advantage of surprise attack. General Sen overruled their
suggestion and ordered a company to occupy the position at the beginning
of October, and the Chinese promptly dispatched troops to cover that approach.

Before leaving the Namka Chu to report to Nehru, Kaul ordered that the
Tsangle position must be held unless pressured by the Chinese, in which
case General Prasad could withdraw it. But a few days later, Kaul ordered
that Tsangle be held at all costs. As Dalvi, Brigadier Singh, and Prasad
all urged that it should be evacuated because of the difficulties in maintaining
and supplying "due to impassable bluffs," Kaul was adamant. Menon, the
officials and Army H.Q. all came to attach high political and strategic
importance to holding the Tsangle position, an order reaffirmed in a conference
on October 17. Another company was ordered to reinforce the company already
there, thus stretching the supply effort of 7 Brigadier to breaking point
and the force on the river line depleted in a hopelessly vulnerable situation.
Meanwhile, Kaul’s pulmonary trouble worsened on October 17 with difficulty
breathing and discomfort. The medical officer at IV Corps diagnosed him
as bronchial allergy exacerbated by respiratory infection, stress and exertion.
On October 18, the officer judged his condition so serious that he was
flown to New Delhi immediately for treatment. Kaul returned to New Delhi
but went straight to his house, indicating that his condition was not as
serious as suggested. Spreading the map on his bed and telephone at hand,
Kaul continued to issue detailed orders for the movements of troops on
the Namka Chu. On the night of October 18, two more companies were ordered
to strengthen Tsangle, to which Dalvi angrily protested. General Prasad
passed on the protest to Kaul, who repeated that the build-up at Tsangle
must be carried out and that commanding officers who defaulted in executing
the order would be removed.

On October 18, the Chinese activity intensified on the southern face
of Thag La ridge. On October 19, a force of two thousand moved at Tseng-jong,
who prepared for a night advance with no effort to conceal their intentions.
Dalvi suggested that the brigade was not able to hold off a Chinese assault
and requested to pull in the Tsangle force for support. General Prasad
passed on the categorical order from Kaul that Tsangle must be held at
all costs. Dalvi told Prasad that "rather than stand by and see the troops
massacred," he would put in his resignation, saying, "it was time someone
took a firm stand." Dalvi’s words were noted and he was promised that Kaul
would be contacted in New Delhi. On the night of October 19-20, the Chinese
troops deployed for assault. They lit fires to keep warn while waiting
and were confident that the Indians would not open fire. At 05.00 on October
20, on the signal of two Very lights, Chinese heavy mortars and artillery
opened heavy barrage on the central Indian position of Thag La ridge. Dalvi
recalled: "As the first salvoes crashed overhead there were a few minutes
of
petrifying shock," in impressive contrast to "the tranquillity that had
obtained hitherto." The weight of the Chinese attack was thrown in the
center of the river line against the Gorkhas and the Rajputs, whose positions
were overrun one after another and met the final Chinese assault with the
bayonet. By 09.00, the Gorkhas and Rajputs were finished, and the Chinese
then brought Tsangdhar under attack, who fought on until the crews were
wiped out. The Chinese plan of breaking through in the center and seizing
Tsangdhar and Hathung La worked out perfectly. 7 Brigade ceased to exist.
On October 22, Brigadier Dalvi was taken prisoner. General Prasad trekked
back to Tawang reaching there on the evening of October 22. The Chinese
ignored Tsangle, which was given high political and strategic importance
by the Indians, as it probably showed in Bhutan on the Chinese maps as
it did on the Indian maps. The Chinese attacked simultaneously in the western
sector, in the Chip Chap River valley, on the Galwan, and in the Pangong
Lake area. After reporting that the Chinese began to shell, the Galwan
post was not heard again. The posts fought their bests, but were soon overwhelmed
and the little garrisons were either killed or captured. Western Command
withdrew some of the smallest and most isolated posts. The fate of the
forward policy and Operation Leghorn ended just as real soldiers foresaw
from the beginning.

(ii) Between
Two Passes

When the Chinese began preparing for the assault on the night of October
18, there was a riot outside the Prime Minister’s residence in New Delhi,
not related to the border, but a protest against the Government’s "apathy
towards the grievances and demands of the poor." As late as October 1962,
the mounting tensions on the border was not the subject of extensive reporting
in the Indian press, which often mentioned nothing of the border other
than occasional front-page news or inside the papers. As the demonstrators
attempted to break through the police, about twenty people were injured
including women and police. In mid-October, a headline in the Hindu read
"Unprovoked Attack on India" referring to an incident in Nepal in which
Nehru had been burned in effigy. As for the borders the political public
in India expected a victorious Indian attack on Thag La until the very
last. On October 19, a published interview reported Menon’s reaffirmation
that the Government was determined to "throw the Chinese back until Indian
territory is cleared of all aggression." He admitted that in Namka Chu
the Chinese outnumbered the Indians and their supply base was closer, but
the Indians had beaten back again and again the Chinese attempts to develop
a bridgehead on the river. On the same day, another paper carried the headline
"Unconfirmed Report of Big Indian Push" reporting a leak form the Defense
Ministry that Indians advanced two miles below Thag La. The next day the
paper issued an official denial, and a few hours later, the news of the
disasters on the Namka Chu began to reach New Delhi.

A shaken Menon told the reporter when asked where the advancing Chinese
could be stopped: "The way they are going there is not any limit to where
they will go." All the past assurances of the Indian advantages were reversed
to become the excuses for defeat. In the evening, Menon explained that
India "had not conditioned her reserves for war purposes." The Indian soldiers
were fighting at high altitudes and had to be air supplied, whereas the
Chinese could be easily supplied from the Tibetan tableland. The Prime
Minister was for once inaccessible to the press. In the first shock, Nehru
was not blamed for the defeat, but had received instinctive sympathy and
trust as the embodiment of an injured and resolute India. Menon served
as a surrogate target, and was to be brought down three days after the
Chinese attack. On October 23, the Congress charged Menon for having misled
Nehru, Parliament and the country. On October 31, Nehru took over the Defense
portfolio as Menon continued in a new post in the Cabinet as a Minister
for Defense Production. This change was mooted years before and dismissed,
but it was a typical political style of Nehru to flout Menon’s critics
by having Menon relinquishing the Defense portfolio. Suspicious that the
change meant nothing but a title, the following day the political correspondents
quoted Menon as saying "nothing has changed" in the working of the Defense
Ministry. On November 7, Nehru played his last card to defend Menon in
front of the Congress Parliamentary Party. He suggested that complaint
against Menon should be leveled at the entire Government and that if resignations
were wanted he might have to proffer his own. A leading Congressman replied:
"Yes, if you continue to follow Menon’s policies we may have to live without
you too." Next day Menon’s resignation was announced. For the first time
the Congress Party openly defied Nehru, and Nehru’s threat of resignation
was exposed as a bluff. Menon’s resignation became a necessary sacrifice
for his own survival. Nehru chose Chavan, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra,
to replace Menon. Chavan accepted with great reluctance and arrived in
the capital the day the border war ended. Profound changes took place in
the political balance in New Delhi. Nehru’s nearly absolute moral authority
waned fast, as the Congress Parliamentary Party began to assert itself.

The world outside also underwent marked shifts. In the West, the Chinese
attack was seen as an assault on the chief Asian democracy. The Daily Telegraph
called it "the first round of struggle for the Asian mind between the Communist
and non-Communist giants of the continent." UN intervention, as in Korea,
was called. The Times printed an apologetic of Nehru’s: "We were getting
out of touch with reality in the modern world and living in an artificial
atmosphere of our own creation." But under the leadership of the British
and American Governments, the Western world extended quick and unquestioning
sympathy and support for India. President Kennedy wrote to Nehru: "Our
sympathy in the situation is wholeheartedly with you. You have displayed
an impressive degree of forbearance and patience in dealing with the Chinese.
You have put into practice what all great religious leaders have urged,
and so few of their followers have been able to do." Then he appraised
the spirituality of Indian policies with an offer of material assistance.
Professor Galbraith, the American Ambassador, took great satisfaction from
and encouraged the emotional gratification of the Indian opinion towards
the U.S. He issued a statement that his Government recognized the McMahon
Line as the international border "sanctioned by modern usage." He overcame
the previous reluctance and lack of commitment of the American Government
to endorse the McMahon Line, and immediately received approval from the
State Department, which at once brought forth "frantic protest" from the
Nationalists. The British Government promptly extended expressions of sympathy
and condemnation of China, while offering help.

As the Western world was solidly with India, the non-alignment countries
whose leadership India aspired were reserved and wary. An Indian correspondent
in the Middle East reported: "Not a single expression of sympathy for India
has come from any Arab Government, any political party or newspaper, or
public personality even a week after the invasion." Another in Africa reported
that Kenyatta and other leaders were non-committal while Nkrumah of Ghana
went farther by rebuking Britain for its offers of military assistance
to India. He wrote to the British Prime Minister, Macmillan: "Whatever
the rights and wrongs of the present struggle between India and China,
I am sure that we can all serve the cause of peace best by refraining from
any action that may aggravate the situation." Since Nehru just visited
Ghana, Nkrumah’s attitude was more offensive to India. Ethiopia and Cyprus
were the only countries among those that attended the 1961 Belgrade Conference
of Non-aligned governments to openly support India. Others showed more
interests in urging restraint and patience on both sides while volunteering
to act as mediators, the role often played by India so far. When Parliament
reassembled, Nehru expressed his resentment at India’s friends, the "well-intentioned
countries" who tried to bring about a ceasefire. "People advise us to be
good and peaceful as if we are inclined to war. In fact, if we are anything,
as the House well knows, we do not possess the war-like mentality and that
is why for the purpose of war there is weakness … So, people talking to
us to be good boys and make it up has no particular meaning, unless they
come to grips with the issues involved." Nehru said that the "so-called
non-aligned countries" (unexpected phrasing from Nehru) were confused and
a little frightened of China, so "it is no good our getting angry with
them (because) they do not stand forthright in our defense, in support
of our position."

The non-aligned countries did less damaging to India’s interests when
compared with the position of Moscow, which now clearly sided to China.
The first intimation of the shift came to New Delhi on October 20, a few
hours after the Chinese attack, in a letter from Krushchev to Nehru warning
India that to take up arms to settle boundary dispute with China was "very
dangerous path." The Indians had made no secret of their intention to use
force against China, as Menon met the Russian Ambassador twice while preparing
for Operation Leghorn. Menon told him about the plan and hoped that Moscow
may pass Peking the word that India meant business and persuade the Chinese
that discretion was better part of diplomacy. In the letter Krushchev urged
Nehru to accept the Chinese proposal for talks. On October 24, Peking renewed
the proposal for disengagement and talks. The next day Pravda commended
the Chinese move as sincere and constructive, providing an acceptable basis
for the talks. The editorial said: "The question of the China-India frontier
is a heritage from those days when British colonialists – who drew and
re-drew the map of Asia at their own will – ruled on the territory of India.
The notorious "McMahon Line," which was never recognized by China, was
foisted on the Chinese and Indian peoples. Imperialist circles have done
everything in their power to provoke an armed clash by speculating on the
border conflicts connected with this Line. The imperialists are dreaming
day and night of setting these great powers at loggerheads, as well as
undermining the Soviet Union’s friendship with fraternal China and friendly
India." Pravda went on to note that "reactionary circles inside India"
were fanning the conflict, and warned that "even some progressively-minded
people" might yield to chauvinistic influences in the heart of the moment.

The critical implications and pro-China attitude of the Russians came
as a blow to the Indian Government. A political correspondent of the Hindu
put it: "It was thought that at best the Russians would continue to adopt
a neutralist attitude. All these hopes were dashed to the ground when Pravda
came out with an editorial wholeheartedly endorsing the Chinese stand …
Mr. Krushchev’s letter to Mr. Nehru runs on exactly the same lines… The
reaction in the capital, not only in official and non-official circles
but also among a section of the Indian Communists, is one of dismay, and
the Soviet attitude is regarded not only as unkind but even as offensive."
The Russians further intimated to the Indian Embassy in Moscow that they
would not be able to supply India with MiG fighters. At the same moment,
Washington detected the first evidence of Russian missiles in Cuba on October
14. After keeping the discovery secret for a week, on October 22, President
Kennedy announced that America would put the island under a selective blockade,
and next day the American Ambassador in India left a copy of the statement
to the Indian Government. In the confrontation with the U.S., it was plainly
of high importance for Krushchev to repair the rift between Moscow and
Peking, and to come out on China’s side in the dispute with India. As disappointed
as he was, Nehru quickly saw the point and said to an American television
interviewer at the end of October: "I should imagine that developments
(in) Cuba, et cetera, probably made it necessary for them not to fall out
with China." He said that he hoped that the missile problem was "out of
the way" and that the Soviet Union would return to its former position.
Krushchev agreed on October 28 to withdraw the missiles, and Russia soon
did just what Nehru hoped for.

For the retreating forces, the most important decision was where to
make a stand. General Thapar and General Sen intended to hold Tawang, where
two infantry battalions and some artillery were stationed. Sen flew to
Tawang on a helicopter on October 22 and ordered the troops to hold Tawang
at all cots, and said that two more brigades were to reinforce them. Next
Morning Sen held meeting with General Prasad, during which each implied
the other lost nerve. But both in Army H.Q. and at IV Corps, the cooler
heads argued strongly that it would be disastrous to hold Tawang. Meanwhile,
the Chinese had developed a three-pronged attack and on October 23 were
advancing toward Tawang, which had no natural defense and the troops standing
there were as easily overcome as on the Namka Chu. In New Delhi, the Director
of Military Operations, Brigadier Palit, strongly urged on Thapar that
Tawang must be evacuated. Thapar consulted Nehru, who told him to make
the military decisions themselves. Kaul was out of picture again. He was
persuaded to hang up his telephones and relinquish command of IV Corps
on the morning that the Chinese attacked. On October 23, IV Corps ordered
the force at Tawang to withdraw sixty miles back to Bomdi La, calculating
that it was the farthest point to the north where the Indians could build
up more quickly than the Chinese. But at Army H.Q. Brigadier Palit urged
strongly that the troops should be ordered to hold at Se La, a high pass
only about fifteen miles behind Tawang, believing Se La an impregnable
natural position that had to be held. Later on October 23, Sen countermanded
the order to pull back to Bomdi La and ordered that Se La must be held.
Brigadier Singh urged to inform New Delhi that it was logistically impossible
to build sufficient defense at Se La. Sen replied that the Cabinet had
decided that Se La should be held and the Government’s orders must be implemented.

The decision was crucial and disastrous. Se La was 14,600 feet high,
flanked by peaks a thousand feet higher. The 5,000-foot climb from Tawang
valley was very steep and was a strong defensive position, but it was a
trap for the Indians. It was too far away from the plains, and the road
could take only one-ton vehicles on a grueling trip of several days from
the foothills to Se La. It was also too high for the defense force who
lacked acclimatization. Air supply was possible but the terrain and weather
made it wholly unreliable. Se La was also too close to Tawang and the Chinese
could mount assault with minimum regrouping and without having to move
their bases forward. The decision to hold Se La committed the Indians to
holding a very deep area from Se La to Bomdi La separated by difficult
and unreliable road through broken country. The Government ruled out the
tactical air support with bombers or ground-attack aircraft for fear of
Chinese retaliation against Indian cities, especially Calcutta. During
the Second World War, some random Japanese bombs fell there and swept the
city with so huge panic that the Government resolved not to risk a repetition.
Considering the terrain in NEFA and the limitations of the Indian Air Force,
it was doubtful that it could have played an effective tactical role. Tawang
was evacuated on October 23, with hundreds of civilians, including lamas
from monastery, going with the troops. On October 25, the Chinese occupied
Tawang without opposition. On the night of October 24, one battalion, 4
Garhwal, panicked and broke to trickle back. They were intercepted and
braced back in the line. Later this battalion cleared its record by beating
off repeated Chinese attacks from its positions flanking Se La.

Meanwhile in the western sector, the Chinese moved south and concentrated
on the Indian forward posts. On October 21, they overran the posts on the
north side of Pangong Lake after severe fighting, the Gorkha garrison fighting
almost to the last man. On October 27, they attacked the posts around Demchok
with similar results. Western Command ordered to evacuate some posts before
the Chinese assault. General Singh of Western Command methodically and
rapidly pulled out troops out of Kashmir to build up strength. By the first
week of November, a Divisional H.Q. was established at Leh, with an additional
brigade of four infantry battalions, and was reinforced by another brigade
by November 17. On the eastern side, there was no such decisive dispatch.
IV Corps got a new commander on October 24, Lieutenant-General Harvaksh
Singh, who was stationed in Simla. Sen removed General Prasad from the
command of 4 Division, replacing him with a soldier with a good combat
record. These kinds of command changes occupied much of Eastern Command’s
energies.

This time Peking used verbal smoke screen to obscure the reality on
the ground. On October 20, the Chinese Defense Ministry issued a statement
that at 07.00 hours that morning the Indian troops had launched large-scale
attacks on the Namka Chu and in the Chip Chap and Galwan valleys in the
western sector. "In self-defense, the Chinese frontier guards were compelled
to strike back resolutely, and cleared away some aggressive strong points
set up by the Indian troops in China’s territory." The Chinese took the
tactic of "turning truth on his head" so often used by Indians and accused
India. The Chinese played into New Delhi’s hands by obscuring the truth.
The Indian intention of attacking the Chinese below Thag La ridge was by
then known everywhere, and Nehru’s airport statement on October 12 confirmed
of Operation Leghorn. However, the Chinese charge that the Indians had
"launched massive attacks" rebounded from the general skepticism about
Indian strength, and was almost immediately belied by Peking’s own announcement
that the Chinese "frontier guards" were carrying out the defensive actions.
It appeared that Chou En-lai did not at first subscribe to the false statement
that the Indians had attacked on October 20. In his letter to Nehru on
November 4, Chou said only that the Indian troops on the Namka Chu had
"made active dispositions for a massive military attack," which was precisely
true as a brigade attack with four battalions could be described as massive.
However, in a letter to the Afro-Asian Governments ten days later, Chou
wrote that India had "launched massive attacks all along the line." Following
the military and diplomatic measures, China made another diplomatic move
adroit in both timing and content. On October 24, Peking released a statement
precisely recapitulating the course of the dispute with India, and reminding
that three times in the past three months India had rejected China’s proposals
for talks without preconditions, and that Nehru had then publicly ordered
the Indian army to "free Indian territory." The statement pointed to the
impossibility of settling the boundary question by force, and the need
to reopen peaceful negotiations. Three proposals were set forth: 1) That
both sides affirm that the dispute must be settled peacefully; agree to
respect the line of actual control; and withdraw their armed forces twenty
kilometers from that line. 2) If India agreed to that, Chinese forces would
be withdrawn to the north of the McMahon Line. 3) The Prime Ministers should
meet again, In Peking or New Delhi, to seek friendly settlement. Chou wrote
Nehru the same day urging that "we should look ahead" and appealing to
Nehru to respond positively.

The Chinese proposal had nothing new in detail, and was the same as
Chou put forward originally in his letter to Nehru of November 7, 1959.
The proposal would have created a ceasefire line along the "line of actual
control," the term that Peking had used to describe the situation from
the beginning in 1959. The Chinese would pull back over the McMahon Line,
and Indian troops in the remaining forward posts in the western sector
would withdraw to the line before the forward policy of 1961. Pulling the
armed forces twenty kilometers back on both sides would create a demilitarized
zone, while leaving civil personnel alone. The proposal had no ambiguities,
but did not state in precise locational detail. The phrase "the line of
actual control" had throughout been used by Peking to describe the situation
in November 1959, when the Chinese were nowhere south of the McMahon Line
or even south of Thag La ridge. The Chinese described the proposal as equal,
mutually accommodatory and based on mutual respect, which objectively merit
the description, but India could not see them objectively. The Indians
viewed that the Chinese had simply added a new and more violent aggression
and now seeking to confirm their criminal gains through diplomacy. New
Delhi rejected instantly the Chinese proposal, in fact without waiting
to receive them officially; they would get the contents from the news agencies’
account. In its reply, the Indian Government released a statement on October
24, first claiming that it was "wedded to peace and peaceful methods (and
had) always sought to resolve differences by talks and discussions … with
China," but "India cannot and will not accept a position under which Chinese
forces continue to commit aggression into Indian territory, occupy substantial
Indian territories and use these as a bargaining counter to force a settlement
on their own terms." The statement proceeded to confuse the Chinese proposal:
"There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw twenty kilometers
from what they call ‘line of actual control’. What is this ‘line of control’?
Is this the line they have created by aggression since the beginning of
September? Advancing forty or sixty kilometers by blatant military aggression
and offering to withdraw twenty kilometers provided both sides do this
is a deceptive device which can fool nobody."

It was most improbable that the officials in the External Affairs Ministry
in New Delhi were really uncertain about the meaning of the Chinese proposal.
Peking had used "the line of actual control" in clear and consistent meaning.
But the Chinese left an opening by not going into more detail, and the
Indians exploited it. Asking for clarification is a classic diplomatic
way of playing for time. A counter-proposal followed: "If the Chinese professions
of peace and peaceful settlement of differences are really genuine, let
them go back at least to the position where they were all along the boundary
prior to 8^th September, 1962. India will then be prepared to
undertake talks and discussions, at any level mutually agreed, to arrive
at agreed measures which should be taken for the easing of tension and
correction of the situation created by unilateral forcible alteration of
the status quo along the India-China boundary." The proposal concluded
that if China accepted it, India would welcome Chou En-lai in New Delhi.
The Indian proposal was as consistent as that of China. It was precisely
the same as New Delhi put forward on October 6, which would have the Chinese
drawing back over Thag La ridge and relinquishing the posts in the western
sector so that the Indians could return to the positions at Dhola Post,
on the Namka Chu, and at Khinzemane. Once China accepted and implemented
that, India would be prepared to talk, but only about Chinese withdrawal
from Aksai Chin. Nehru sent the statement with proposal to Chou En-lai
on October 27, in a letter with civil tone, which was remarkable since
Nehru called "a Chinese invasion of India."

On November 4, Chou En-lai replied that the "line of actual control"
was referred to the same line that he had proposed in 1959. He explained:
"The fact that the Chinese Government’s proposal has taken as its basis
the 1959 line of actual control and not the present line of actual contact
between the armed forces of the two sides is full proof that the Chinese
side has not tried to force any unilateral demand on the Indian side on
account of the advances gained in the recent counterattack in self-defense."
The Indian counter-proposal would have Indian troops return to their dispositions
for attack on the Namka Chu and to the forward posts in the western sector.
Chou asked: "How can the Chinese Government agree to revert to such a position?"
Chou appealed to Nehru to reconsider the Chinese proposal. Nehru’s next
letter sharply changed the tone. He described the Chinese attacks as "cold-blood(ed)
… massive aggression" and declared that for India to accept the Chinese
proposal "would mean mere existence at the mercy of an aggressive, arrogant
and expansionist neighbor." He reiterated that the Indian troops must go
back to the positions they had occupied all along the boundaries on September
8, and suggested that China could demonstrate its bona fides by withdrawing
its forces to the 1959 positions. The effect of that was that the Indians
would reestablish in all their forward posts, while the Chinese would stay
well back from their positions set up to counter India’s forward policy.

The diplomatic exchange during the Chinese occupation of Tawang showed
that New Delhi’s approach to the boundary dispute only hardened. The Indians
were as adamant as ever that they would not negotiate a boundary settlement,
and their insistence on return to their forward posts showed that the assumptions
of forward policy remained unchanged. Peking gained nothing after smashing
the puny threats that India built up below Thag La and wiping out half
the forward Indian posts in the western sector. The Indians were more confident
than ever and the political atmosphere in India had now become almost unanimously
bellicose. But the Chinese conception had only begun to be put into effect.
Before the attacks on October 20, a senior minister in Peking said that
China was going to have to advance well to the south of the points and
then withdraw. Like a jab of a boxer that seemingly jolts the opponent,
the first attacks only set up for the knockout. The political side was
also working out as planned. The defeat on the Namka Chu and belief that
India was at war with China swept away Nehru’s resistance to accepting
military aid. Only a few weeks before, he had rejected the suggestion that
India might seek arms aid, saying it meant becoming "somebody else’s dependent"
by "joining some military bloc," and declared that he would never agree
to this, "even if disaster comes to us on the frontier." But on October
29, when the American Ambassador called, Nehru instantly accepted the offer
of military equipment. The writer reported to The Times: "The decision
to accept American military assistance, reversing policies that India had
cherished since she became a nation, was taken formally at a Cabinet meeting
today." Lists of India’s military needs were prepared and handed to the
Americans, with the Embassy in New Delhi expressing dismay at the scope
of the Indian requests and the disorganization and confusions. The Pentagon
used its new computerized stock-keeping record and quickly flew first supplies
from West Germany in jet freighters, which began landing in India five
days later.

Chou En-lai wrote to the heads of the Afro-Asian Governments: "The Indian
Government has openly begged military aid from the United States." The
People’s Daily described the "development of historic significance:" India’s
acceptance of American military aid "points to the fact that Nehru Government
has finally shed its cloak of non-alignment policy … The more Nehru depends
on U.S. imperialism, the greater the need is there for him to meet the
needs of U.S. imperialism and persist in opposing China. And the more he
persists in opposing China, the greater the need for him to depend on U.S.
imperialism. Thus he is caught in a vicious circle. His gradual shedding
of his policy of ‘non-alignment’ is precisely the inevitable result of
his sell-out to U.S. imperialism." This statement confirmed Peking’s analysis
of the nature of Nehru government, making a key point in the argument with
Moscow, and also underlined to Peking the importance of not letting the
fighting drag on. A Chinese official "disgustedly" told a Western correspondent
early in November that "as long as the Indians go on attacking us they
will get anything they want out of the United States. They’re making millions
of dollars out of these skirmishes, they’ll probably go on for ever." As
the Afro-Asian Governments declined to come out clearly on Indian side,
it may have indicated to the Chinese that India’s version of events now
at last being met with skepticism. In mid-November, Chou En-lai wrote the
heads of Asian and African governments thanking them for their "fair-minded
endeavors to promote direct negotiations between China and India" and affirming
that China wanted only a peaceful settlement with India. As the Cuba crisis
relaxed, Moscow’s sudden objectivity about the dispute died, as Nehru expected.
Early in November, Moscow called on both sides for a ceasefire and negotiations,
ignoring the fact that India had just refused negotiations once more. In
Peking’s view, the Cuba confrontation was brought on by Krushchev’s "adventurism"
in deploying Russian missiles, and compounded by his "capitulationism"
in backing down and removing them under American pressure. The completion
of the Chinese operation against India would show the world that threats
and vaunts of the imperialists and their creatures could be ignored with
impunity, thus underlining the pusillanimity and incompetence of Krushchev
and his "revisionist clique."

The first defeat sent shock waves into India’s resolution to war, which
grew into optimism, and then was seen and enjoyed as India’s hour of greatness,
of which fruit was national unity and ultimate triumph. After the initial
unfeigned astonishment and outrage over Chinese attack, it was almost forgotten
that Indian Army had been about to take offensive action, and that the
Government had refused to meet with the Chinese for talks. Nehru now complained
that if the Chinese "had any claim they could have discussed it and talked
about it and adopted various means of peaceful settlement." Asok Mehta
asked later: "Why, in the face of our patience, goodwill and obvious anxiety
for settlement, have the Chinese persisted in this aggression?" Menon commented:
"We never went into Chinese territory. And even if it was ‘disputed’ territory
in Chinese eyes, did that justify them starting a war? for us, it was not
disputed territory. It was ours." The Lok Sabha put formally a resolution,
in which it affirmed the "resolve of the Indian people to drive out the
aggressor from the sacred soil of India": "This House notes with deep regret
that in spite of the uniform gestures of goodwill and fellowship by India
towards China … China has betrayed that good-will and friendship … and
has committed aggression and initiated a massive invasion of India." It
was entirely forgotten in disapproval of China’s use of force that India
had intended the same, as Nehru pointed out: "We are perfectly justified
in pushing them and attacking them." The reaction of the Indian political
classes and urban masses was vigorous. The Chinese were condemned in public
meetings, army-recruiting stations were rushed, and students burned effigies
of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. The shops of Chinese in New Delhi and
Calcutta, shoemakers and curio dealers, were mobbed and their owners beaten
up. Japanese diplomats plastered their cars with "rising sun" emblems to
avoid mistaken identification for Chinese. The Government introduced an
ordinance that treated even Indian citizens of Chinese descent as enemy
aliens, and several thousand were interned in camps in Rajasthan and were
later expelled to China.

The popular commitment to the struggle with China deemed the signs of
disunity as "fissiparousness" as superficial, underneath that lay an emotionally
integrated nation. The Lok Sabha praised "the wonderful and spontaneous
response of the people of India to the emergency … this mighty upsurge
amongst all sections of our people." Nehru thanked China more poetically
for having "suddenly lifted a veil from the face of India, (giving) a glimpse
of the serene face of India, strong and yet calm and determined, an ancient
face which is ever young and vibrant." An Opposition Socialist invoked
"the blood of our martyred jawans, (which) is becoming the seed of a new,
virile nation that is being born in our country." Ignoring the obvious
gusto of the response toward war, Nehru insisted on the inherent and unshakable
pacifism of Indians. He said, in contrast to the Chinese who were conditioned
to war and seemed to "think that war was a natural state of affairs," the
Indians were "disliking it, excessively disliking the idea of war – emotionally
disliking it, apart from not liking its consequences." He invoked Gandhi
and reminded parliament that "basically we are a gentle people" and expressed
fear that war would change it. "It alarms me that we should become, because
of the exigencies of war, brutalized, a brutal nation. I think that would
mean the whole soul and spirit of India being demoralized, and that is
a terribly harmful thing. Certainly I hope that all of us will remember
this." Nehru had made central the belief in the inherent and peculiar pacifism
and gentleness of the Indian people in the course of the dispute with China,
in domestic utterances, letters to Chou En-lai, and diplomatic notes to
Peking. Nehru’s belief in this myth derived perhaps from his closeness
to Gandhi. But the truth lies somewhere between Nehru’s view of "a gentle
people" and Nirad Chaudhur’s, that "few human communities have been more
warlike and fond of bloodshed (than the Indians)."

A cartoon in the Time of India epitomized the intense gratification
with public response heard in almost every comment. Captioned as "War with
China," Nehru and his Cabinet colleagues labeled a wall of graphs with
"Emotional Integration, Industrial Peace, People’s Faith in Government."
Nehru commented: "We never had it so good," and pointed out elegantly:
"This challenge may be converted into opportunity for us to grow and to
change the dark cloud that envelops our frontiers into the bright sun not
only of freedom but of welfare in this country." For the Indian political
classes, war was remote, romantic and therapeutic. For the urban masses
it was circus, an open opportunity to join a parade and shout slogans.
For the villagers, it was remote but vaguely alarming threat to the village,
rather than the nation, which was a concept beyond the interest of the
village mass in India. In contrast to the excitement and commitment in
India, in China the fighting was consistently played down and the conflict
minimized. A Western correspondent in Peking reported that "newspaper coverage
is more political than military and even Chinese successes have constantly
been played down. There has been no attempt to make the reader keenly war-conscious.
Rare and laconic situation reports are printed in the guarded words of
the New China News Agency." On the other hand, the Indian government treated
the border fighting as an undeclared war. Nehru explained: "We may not
be technically at war, but the fact is that we are at war, though we have
not made any declaration to that effect – it is not necessary at the present
moment to do so, I do not know about the future." However, Nehru resisted
strong pressure throughout to break off diplomatic relations with Peking
and in the UN, India maintained its support for Peking, although no longer
taking the lead to press the issue of China’s representation.

The Indian Government declared statement of emergency, overriding powers
and suspending civil liberties. The shock of the Namka Chu debacle was
worn off, and replaced by euphoria of "mafficking in defeat," as it was
called. At the end of October, The Times reported: "There has been a palpable
growth of confidence in New Delhi that, whatever the Chinese intentions,
they can be held and in due course beaten." The newspapers reported "heartening
indications that after the initial reverses the Indian troops in NEFA were
beginning to consolidate themselves into effective defensive positions,
and were even initiating attempts to dislodge the Chinese from Indian territory."
As Parliament was called into session ten days early on November 8, Menon
took the edge off Parliament’s anger. Nehru still had a lot of explaining
to do, but he was confident and not at all apologetic. Nehru gave the basic
reason for the Indian reverse as they were outnumbered. The only hint of
whether 7 Brigade should be pulled back from Namka Chu was: "The only fault
we made … if it is a fault, was even to stick (it) out where the military
situation was not very favorable. It was not that we told them to stick
it out – it is folly for any politician to say so. But our soldiers themselves
have a reluctance to go back, and they stuck on at considerable cost to
them." The statement implied that Nehru was never informed about the urgent
representations made by the field commanders to speedily withdraw the troops.
Kaul, Sen and Thapar must have impressed him that the troops had "a reluctance
to go back." Nehru made his long and familiar argument to Parliament in
response to the rumors of inadequate equipment and supplies of the troops,
which were circulating in the capital by now. Nehru assumed the role of
the country’s war leader, and snapped at other politicians who questioned
him: "It is really extraordinary that many persons here who know nothing
about arms talk about arms." Since 1954, when Pakistan began receiving
American military aid, and especially after the first boundary clashes
with China in 1959, the Indian Government had been urging to accept whatever
assistance available and strengthen the armed services. Now Nehru was bitterly
criticized for his refusal to follow the suit. In a previous Parliament
session, Nehru said, "taking military help is basically and fundamentally
aligned to that country." But now American jet transports were landing
in India with eight flights per day, each carrying about twenty tons of
equipment including automatic rifles, heavy mortars, recoilless guns, et
cetera. The British had been quicker as their first loads of arms aid landed
the day Nehru accepted Kennedy’s offer of help. It was plain that only
the U.S. had the means and the motive to provide the massive assistance
India required. The British made their first contributions an outright
gift, and the Americans left terms to be negotiated later. The French and
others saw no reason to waive the usual commercial requirements, earning
certain amount of ill will in New Delhi as a result. India also turned
to Israel, which India had refused to open diplomatic relations for fear
of losing Arab support for its position about Kashmir. Now India asked
if the weapons Israel agreed to provide could be delivered in ships that
did not fly the Israeli flag, thereby allowing India to avail itself of
Israel’s help without incurring Arab displeasure. But Ben Gurion reportedly
replied that "no flag, no weapons," and a shipment of heavy mortars arrived
in Bombay in an Israeli ship.

As American weapons were unloaded a few miles away, an independent politician
suggested that India should point out to the west that it was fighting
a world war on behalf of democracy, echoing Churchill’s words: "Give us
the tools and we will finish the job." Nehru maintained that because the
supplies of armaments were "unconditional and without any strings" they
did not affect non-alignment. It was soon to be seen that Britain and the
U.S. used their supply of armaments to lever Nehru into reopening negotiations
with Pakistan over Kashmir, with the implicit threat to cut the supply.
The six days of debate, in which one hundred and sixty-five members spoke,
a generalized critique of the Government’s policy was mounted, with strong
feeling that India had been let down by many countries. One party questioned:
"How is it that so large a number of these countries (for whom) we did
so much in the many spheres of world politics" were not sympathizing with
and supporting India? The resentment over the failure of the non-aligned
and Afro-Asian countries not to repay India’s past generosity gave rise
to a wave of enthusiasm for the U.S. and the Commonwealth. The Hindustan
Times described that "a great fellowship of nations suddenly stirred to
a sense of responsibility for the security and freedom of one of its members."
In reconsidering its foreign policy, New Delhi changed even its approach
to the Nationalist Government on Formosa. As one newspaper put it: "India
should maneuver to spring a second front on the Chinese … This means that
we must do everything to activate Formosa’s invasion threat on the south
China coast … and "to this end liaison with Taipeh and even more so with
the Pentagon is called for." The following March, a Nationalist representative
came to New Delhi for talks with the Ministry of External Affairs. The
Chinese Nationalists were ready to join India in all expressions of hostility
towards the Peking Government, but were careful to point out that there
were no differences with the Chinese Communists in their approach to the
boundary dispute. The Formosa Government released a formal statement at
the end of October: "The so-called McMahon Line is a line unilaterally
claimed by the British during their rule over India. The Government of
the Republic of China has never accepted this line of demarcation, and
is strongly opposed to the British claim."

Parliament also criticized Nehru’s harping on the special peaceableness
of Indians and the national commitment to non-violence. Now war had come,
taking up arms was more meaningful to Indians than that of Gandhi and his
non-violence. From the end of October, the general optimism that the worst
was over and victories were at hand grew steadily, encouraged by official
accounts of what was happening in NEFA. The press proclaimed: "Indians
attack under cover of artillery – heartening forward thrust in NEFA." A
Congress M.P. who went to the front reported that the morale of the troops
was exuberant: "They are simply shouting our Mahatma Gandhi’s name and
the Prime Minister’s name to enthuse themselves." Another told a public
meeting on November 12 that "India was now strong enough to repulse the
Chinese attackers and was building its military might to drive the invaders
from Indian soil." Meanwhile, the Chinese in October and beginning of November
continued their methodical elimination of the Indian forward posts in the
western sector, softening the Indian positions with intense barrages before
overrunning them with infantry. But the continuing defeat in the western
sector did not shadow the Indian optimism, of which attention was focused
on the Walong front. A big Indian victory was expected, as the headlines
read on November 16: "Jawans swing into attack."

The Army H.Q. and down the line of command also shared the belief that
the Chinese would not launch further attacks in NEFA and that the worst
was over with the debacle on the Namka Chu. The orders to move the troops
to NEFA were countermanded when the Chinese stopped their advance, and
for three weeks there was little urgency in the Indian build-up around
Se La. The contingency plan was based on the assumption that Pakistan would
not take advantage of a Chinese attack, but in October 1962 intelligence
report of President Ayub’s attitude led to second thought in New Delhi.
Although American representation to Pakistan and reassurance relieved the
Indian anxiety, moving troops to the northeast was delayed. The Chinese
were working twenty-four hours a day, and steadily getting nearer to Se
La ridge, from which the blasting of explosives could be heard. The road
was through by early November and the Chinese trucks moved in Tawang towards
Se La. Meanwhile, they patrolled forward towards and around the Indian
positions, without the knowledge of Indians, penetrating into NEFA by passes
and trails. General Harbaksh Singh at IV Corps expressed his pride "with
abiding faith in our nation and our leaders and in the sacred cause of
our motherland," but he was soon replaced by Kaul, who resumed command
after having recovered from the "chill and severe attack of bronchitis."
General Sen protested to General Thapar against this change, and the latter
replied that Kaul was returning to be rehabilitated. Nehru stated in front
of Parliament about the rehabilitation of his protege: "I want to mention
his name especially because quite extraordinarily unjust things have been
said about him." He went on: "Some people say he had not had any experience
of fighting. That is not correct. He had the experience of fighting in
Burma … I doubt … in sheer courage and initiative and hard work, if we
can find anybody to beat him." The truth was as General Thimayya put it:
"Every sepoy in the Army knows that Kaul has never been a combat soldier,
you can’t hide that sort of thing in the Army. The officers don’t respect
Kaul." The troops reacted in tune with Thimayya’s view to Kaul’s resumed
command.

On October 26, just before Kaul resumed command, he described that his
tactics had been deliberately "a policy of cheek." The Tseng-jong battle
was only the result of his move to feel out Chinese intentions. He was
confident that the Chinese could be held at Se La, and in due course beaten
back. On October 29, Kaul returned and resumed control of IV Corps, as
the Indians forces were being built up in NEFA. The troops were inducted
to NEFA and distributed wildly, not as part of an overall defense plan
but according to the Intelligence Bureau’s estimates of where the Chinese
were likely to move. The troops trekked into the hills with the weapons
and ammunitions they could carry to take up positions picked out on maps
at headquarters in New Delhi. These deployments were made to engage the
Chinese on the McMahon Line and were rationalized with the expectation
of no strong Chinese attack. Nehru explained in Parliament why the Army
tried to fight below Thag La ridge, "partly because to the last moment
we did not expect this invasion in overwhelming numbers, partly from the
fact that we disliked … the idea of walking back in our own territory."
Five years later Menon conceded that it would be strategically better to
"let (the Chinese) come into Indian territory in depth before giving them
a fight," admitting that he and his Prime Minister consciously went against
the strategic advantage to mollify an uninformed and shallow "public opinion."

In 1962, as the Intelligence Bureau pointed to the Lohit valley as a
likely marching line for the Chinese, the Indians built up at Walong, which
was one hundred miles, of two-week march, in addition to the enormous difficulties
for air supply. The Chinese attacked on October 21 on the two-infantry
battalions and some Assam Rifles, and were beaten off with heavy losses
on both sides. The Walong sector was initially the responsibility of 5
Infantry Brigade, part of 4 Division. After fall of Tawang, a new divisional
headquarters was created to command the whole of NEFA, which was designated
as 2 Division under the command of Major-General MS Pathania. By the beginning
of November 2 Division had settled down with three infantry battalions
and some Assam Rifles platoons at Walong. General Pathania was convinced
and in turn convinced Kaul that with an additional battalion, he could
drive the Chinese back to the McMahon Line. The opening attack was planned
for November 13 and was to be completed on November 14. The additional
battalion began arriving only on November13, but II brigade did not delay
its attack. The dates otherwise had no military significance, but November
14 was Nehru’s seventy-third birthday. Kaul and Pathania came up to Walong
with the thought of giving a present for the Prime Minister, as "our first
major success against the enemy." On November 14, two companies of the
6^th Kumanon battalion, supported by heavy mortars and field
guns, moved into an assault on the hill held by the Chinese, who were believed
to be company strength. After six hours of fight, they were still fifty
yards away from the crest. At night, a Chinese counterattack cleared the
surviving Kumanois off the hill, which was what the Indian newspapers hailed
on November 16 that "Jawans swing into attack."

The Chinese followed up the retreating Kumaonis and penetrated the main
Indian defense positions. Having fire off all the shells in support of
the Kumaonis, the Indian artillery could not engage the main Chinese assault
when it came at first light on the 16^th. The Indians fought
grimly. After ceasefire, the returning Indians found in some posts every
man dead. Kaul ordered withdrawal, but some troops did not receive it and
fought on until their ammunition ran out or they were killed. Kaul sent
a frantically worded signal reporting the defeat at Walong: "It is now
my duty to urge that the enemy thrust is now so great and his overall strength
is so superior that you should ask the highest authorities to get such
foreign armed forces to come to our aid as are willing to do so without
which, as I have said before and which I reiterate, it seems beyond the
capacity of our armed forces to stem the tide of the superior Chinese forces
which he has and will continue to concentrate against us to out disadvantage.
This is not a counsel of fear, but facing stark realities." Kaul had the
idea of getting allied expeditionary armies for some days. When the Cabinet
Secretary called him for ideas, Kaul reportedly "produced from beneath
his pillow a paper of recommendation. India should seek help of some foreign
powers; Chiang Kai-shek and the South Koreans should be induced to invade
China with American help."

As the climax developed in the crucial Se La-Bomdi La sector, the western
sector also had endured attacks. Unlike Eastern Command and IV Corps, Western
Command showed more concern for the survival of their troops than ordering
isolated units to "fight it out" in useless and sacrificial gestures. In
the eastern sector, the troops often fought to the last round or the last
man to hold tactically insignificant and indefensible positions. Western
Command continued an urgent and heavy build-up withdrawing troops from
Kashmir, and despite arduous conditions, strength was built up in Ladakh
by November 17. On November 18, the Chinese artillery bombardment began
on the Indian outposts, airfield and brigade positions. Heavy mortars,
recoilless guns and rockets softened the shallow Indian entrenchment. Of
one company of another Kumaonis battalion, three wounded reached Battalion
H.Q. in the valley, five were taken prisoner, and the rest of the company
were found, three months later, frozen as they died with weapons in their
hand. Only the Chinese bodies were removed, and evidence showed that there
had been many. Five hours after, the Chinese launched assault on the hill
positions, but stopped at their claim line and no attack was made on Chushul.

In the Se La-Bomdi La sector of NEFA, the Indian build-up was relatively
sluggish, spreading in three main locations the 4 Division with a full
complement of infantry, ten battalions, and supporting arms of field artillery,
heavy mortars and a dozen light tanks. General Pathania ordered 4 Division
to hold Se La to block the Chinese entry through NEFA to the plains. In
the beginning of November, Pathania dispatched troops taken from the Bomdi
La garrison to block what he saw as likely routes for Chinese outflanking
moves. On the night of November 16, the Bomdi La garrison was reduced from
three battalions (twelve companies) to six companies, about a third of
the strength required to defend the position. On the midday of November
17, the Chinese attacked the Guards who fought for three hours until they
ran out of ammunition, and withdrew to Bomdi La. After disintegrating the
Guards, the Chinese had cut the road between Bomdi La and Dirang Dzong.
The Chinese also attacked a battalion deployed several miles north of Se
La. By early afternoon, Pathania asked IV Corps at Tezpur for permission
to pull his headquarters out of Dirang Dzong. Pathania realized that the
Chinese had cut the road meant that Se La would be wholly dependent upon
air supply, and that the garrisons would be wiped out as they ran out of
supplies. On the evening of the 17^th, Pathania telephone IV
Corps again and asked for permission to pull the troops off Se La. Kaul
still had not returned from helicoptering around the rear of the lost battle
in Walong, but Generals Thapar and Sen, who were superiors to Kaul, declined
to give Pathania any orders. Kaul returned to headquarters in the evening
and, with Thapar and Sen, drafted a signal to 4 Division, in what was a
masterpiece of military buck-passing. It could be read in two ways. Pathania
was given authority to fight if he decided to do so. The signals said:
"You will hold on to your present positions to the best of your ability.
Your only course is to fight it out as best you can." However, if he decided
to withdraw, the signal authorized him to withdraw, as the signal said:
"When any position becomes untenable I delegate the authority to you to
withdraw to any alternative position you can hold." The signal was phrased
to shift responsibility for the decision back to Pathania. For the Commander
48 Brigade at Bomdi La, Kaul ordered "to attack this enemy force tonight
speedily and resolutely and keep this road clear at all costs." Brigadier
Hoshiar Singh protested pointing out that he was left with only six rifle
companies. Kaul agreed to suspend the order until next morning when two
battalions of reinforcements were expected to reach Bomdi La. Next morning
Pathania received the ambiguous signal and decided to withdraw in the following
night.

The Chinese moved at nights, without firing, and followed up the withdrawing
Indians closely and occupied the positions. When the Chinese opened fire,
troops of one battalion began to break and move back. At dawn of the 18,
the Chinese assaulted the last Indian troops in territory claimed by Peking
in the western sector. The Chinese found the Indian forces emptying on
Se La, their heavy weapons, artillery and stores left where they stood.
Among these were American automatic rifles still in crates. The Chinese
moved into the deserted positions around the pass and opened fire on the
retreating Indians beneath them. At five in the morning, at Dirang Dzong
there was "a complete absence of war-like atmosphere" with quietness and
officers sleeping in their huts. As a company Pathania dispatched came
to cover Dirang Dzong, the Chinese opened light small-arms fire on Divisional
H.Q. from a thousand yards away. Pathania gave hurried oral orders to the
cavalrymen to fight through to Bomdi La, and if they could not, abandon
their tanks and head for the plains. Pathania then left Dirang Dzong with
fellow officers and a few troops headed toward Bomdi La and, after finding
out it had fallen, made for the plains.

No one took command at Dirang Dzong in Pathania’s place. The forces
there, including two battalions of infantry, a squadron of light tanks,
a battery of field guns, and hundreds of personnel from Divisional and
Brigade H.Q., went to a sauve qui peut in the morning of November 18. One
of the battalions reached the plains as a unit, the rest struggled through
in small parties. Chinese ambushes took a toll, so did the wild country
and the winter. Divisional H.Q. did not inform anyone that it was quitting
the field. The commands at Se La and Bomdi la were left quiet in the dark,
as was IV Corps at Tezpur. Brigadier Hoshiar Singh attempted to knock out
the Chinese machine-guns, which fired on the withdrawing troops from Se
La, but the attempt failed. With the road impassable, the Chinese fire
took heavy casualties, and the brigade disintegrated into small parties,
making for the plains individually. Many of the parties were ambushed and
killed or captured in the following days, and Brigadier Hoshiar Singh was
shot dead at Phutang on November 27. By mid-morning on November 18, 48
Brigade at Bomdi La was the only organized Indian formation left in NEFA.
The brigade had six rifle companies, and was awaiting the Chinese attack
in prepared positions supported by field guns, heavy mortars, and the guns
of four light tanks. At about 11.00 a.m., Kaul ordered 48 Brigade to send
out a mobile column to relieve Dirang Dzong (not knowing it was empty by
then). Brigadier Gurbax Singh protested again, Kaul angrily and categorically
ordered him to get the mobile column on the road within half an hour irrespective
of the consequences to Bomdi La. Ten minutes after, as two infantry companies
with two tanks and tow mountain guns were pulled out towards Dirang Dzong,
the first shock of the Chinese assault came and was beaten off. But Indian
counterattack against the next major Chinese attack failed. Gurbax Singh
ordered a withdrawal of eight miles south to Rupa, where they began to
organize a defense on the night of 18^th. But IV Corps ordered
them to pull back to Foothills, a village just above the plains. As troops
moved accordingly, Kaul ordered them to stand at Rupa. The troops turned
back to Rupa, and came under fire from the Chinese who had already taken
up dominating positions in the hills around. The brigade, now about one
battalion in strength, marched back through November 19 and reached Chaku
just after dark. But the Chinese struck at Chaku from three sides soon
after midnight, ambushing a column that was bringing up supplies and ammunition.
The surviving troops made for the plains in small parties. By November
20, no organized Indian military force was left in NEFA or in the territory
claimed by China in the western sector. Militarily the Chinese victory
was complete, the Indian defeat absolute. However, the retreat continued,
as Kaul returned to Corps H.Q. in Tezpur late on the night of November
19, he ordered the Corps H.Q. to move immediately to Gauhati, nearly a
hundred miles to the west and on the other side of the Brahmaputra. Next
day Kaul helicoptered over the trails and gave Pathania and some wounded
men a lift to Tezpur.

The news of the fall of Walong, released in New Delhi only on November
18, sent a greater shock than the debacle at Thag La ridge. There the public
believed that Indian troops were taken by surprise by the Chinese attack
as an infantry Pearl Harbor. But in Walong, the Indian Army had three weeks
to prepare itself and was in fact on the offensive. In the evening briefing
to the press, it was announced that the Chinese had attacked Se La and
fighting was going on there. After a glow of optimism and expectation of
an Indian victory at Walong, now the Prime Minister not only confirmed
in the morning newspaper reports on the fall of Walong, but also said that
Se La had fallen too. After the House heard Nehru’s short statement in
dead silence, there was uproar of angry questioning and expostulation.
Nehru sat silent, with his dominance of the House gone for good. Nehru
addressed himself to the people of Assam: "Now what has happened is very
serious and very saddening to us… We shall not be content till the invader
goes out of India or is pushed out. We shall not accept any terms that
he may offer because he may think that we are a little frightened by some
setbacks…" On November 20, the American Ambassador noted "ultimate panic
in Delhi, the first time I have ever witnessed the disintegration of public
morale." Fear was in the air, and rumors were spreading that the Chinese
were about to take Tezpur, even land paratroops in the capital, and that
General Kaul was taken prisoner. Late that night Nehru made an urgent and
open appeal for the intervention of the United States with bombers and
fighters squadrons to go into action against the Chinese. Nehru requested
fifteen squadrons and appealed American aircraft to undertake strikes against
Chinese troops on Indian territory and to provide cover for Indian cities.
In response, an American aircraft carrier was dispatched from the Pacific
towards Indian waters, but the crisis passed twenty-four hours after Nehru
made this appeal, and the aircraft carrier turned back.

That appeal was not the only step taken in the shock of the debacle.
Nehru had been emphasizing from the beginning that India was not fighting
Communism because it was fighting China. The distinction was necessary
not only to the posture of non-alignment, but to cushion India’s relations
with the USSR. But on November 20, orders went out to arrest several hundred
leading members of the Communist Party. The intention was to arrest only
those belonged to the left wing, but a muddle in the Home Ministry resulted
in arresting many of the party’s centrists and some of its pro-Moscow wing.
Nehru complained to the Home Minister that it would give India a bad name
in the Communist countries. But simply to let them all out again would
compound the embarrassment, so it was decided to release the mistakenly
imprisoned ones one by one in order not to make it look like a confession
of error. As the Home Minister was looking to the country’s security, some
politicians were worried about the political stability. Some in the Opposition
and Congress suggested to President Radhakrishnan of suspending Parliament
and making the Cabinet an advisory committee to the president, which was
wooly and short of a coup, to which the Radhakrishnan gave no encouragement.
In Tezpur, it was feared that the invaders would reach the town in a few
hours. On November 18, the civil administration ceased to function, with
the loudspeaker warning the townspeople that the authorities could no longer
be responsible for their safety. Great crowds, including released convicts
and inmates of the local asylum, gathered at the ferry, which carried up
to a thousand people a trip, rather than their safe load of three or four
hundred, across the Brahmaputra River. Those who stayed at the State Bank
tried to burn some £300,000 worth of currency, including the coin;
they first tried to get rid of coin by throwing it in a lake but people
began diving for it. The disorganization at Tezpur was later blamed on
the state Government and local administration, but at least part of the
responsibility can be traced to the Home Ministry in New Delhi, which instructed
selective evacuation of the town and destruction of currency. Kaul had
personally briefed two ministers of the state government on the morning
of the 20^th that the Chinese were coming, with a possible paratroop
landing at Misamari and air raid on Tezpur likely. General Thapar returned
to New Delhi late on November 19 and submitted his resignation to the Prime
Minister. Even now Nehru’s first thought was that Kaul should succeed Thapar
as Chief of Army Staff. After discussing with the Radhakrishnan, as there
was still no Defense Minister, the idea was dismissed as absurd and instead
suggested General Chaudhuri as the new Army Chief. On the morning of November
21, as the Home Minister’s party prepared to fly to Assam, they noticed
a crowd and an air of excitement around the newsstand. One of them went
to buy a paper and learned the headline announcement that China was going
to unilaterally stop the fighting and then withdraw from NEFA. They immediately
went to the Prime Minister’s residence, where Nehru gave the impression
that he had not heard the Chinese announcement, although the news had reached
the newspapers several hours before. Thus the Government learned that China
had been engaged not on an invasion of India, but on a giant punitive expedition.

Part V: Ceasefire

When the world learned on November 21, 1962, the border war in the Himalayas
was to be ended by China’s unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal. The Times
expressed the universal reaction: "Astonishment almost blots out relief
at the sudden Chinese decision." Chou En-lai called the Indian chargé
d’affaires to his residence and told him in detail of China’s intentions:
"1) Beginning from 00.00 on November 21, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards
will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. 2) Beginning from
December 1, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions
20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China
and India on November 7, 1959." The proposal further spelled out clearly
that "in the eastern sector… the Chinese frontier guards … withdraw … to
north of the line of actual control, that is, north of the illegal McMahon
Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from that line" and that "in
the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw
twenty kilometers from the line of actual control." The Indians would be
expected to keep their armed forces twenty kilometers away from the line
of actual control too, and China "reserved the right to strike back" if
they did not do so. This proposal was the same when Chou En-lai first made
it to Nehru in his letter of November 7, 1959, and was reiterated after
the Namka Chu battle. India rejected the repeated and consistent Chinese
insistence of it as the only possible way to defuse the border, most recently
and brusquely on October 24 after the first Chinese attack. Now, at the
point of smoking gun, a victorious China imposed not a victor’s terms but
what she had proposed all along.

The Indian Army had no doubt about the response to the ceasefire. The
new Chief of Army Staff, General Chaudhuri, reported that his forces were
in no condition to do anything but reciprocate the Chinese move. However,
the story was different for the politicians, as usual, whose most frequent
use of the word was "humiliation." While the soldiers were relieved, the
civilians took the unilateral Chinese ceasefire as rubbing salt in the
wounds. There was nearly unanimous opinion to reject Peking’s "offer" out
of hand. Nehru played for time, simply saying that no official message
about a ceasefire had been received from Peking. As for negotiations, "our
position … continues to be … that the position as it existed prior to September
8, 1962, shall be restored." The Opposition members denounced "a typical
piece of calculated Chinese trickery" and demanded assurances that the
Government would ignore the ceasefire and continue to refuse negotiations.
One politician cried: "Decency, dignity and self-respect require that we
negotiate only after the barbarians are driven out." As some called the
Chinese move "fraudulent," others saw it as an ultimatum. All the Opposition
Parties except the Communists issued a joint statement: "The Chinese offer
of a unilateral ceasefire is only another of their notorious maneuvers,
calculated to cause confusion and disruption in our national front, gain
time for consolidation and build up for another infamous offensive and
prevent us from mobilizing resources from inside and outside and create
doubts in the minds of our friend in world democracy." The statement continued
that the Prime Minister must not allow himself to be taken in, and the
Government should reassure the nation that it would stand firmly by the
policy of determined resistance and no negotiations.

When it was announced that the Chinese declaration was received that
night, the spokesman refused to comment: "Let us wait and see." Neither
then nor later would officials confirm that the troops had been ordered
to observe the ceasefire, for that would be taken as admission that India
had surrendered. In contrary, the Government strove to give the impression
that India had just started to fight. Nehru fondly reassured a gathering
of school-children: "The war with China will be long-drawn-out affair,
it may take years – it may take so long that some of you will be fit and
ready to fight it." In the following days, the Chinese diplomats were called
to the Ministry of External Affairs for clarifications on the meaning of
"line of actual control," and if the Chinese withdrew twenty kilometers,
"where will that be?" Peking described these questioning as meaningless.
These were clearly spelled out in the ceasefire statement and restated
by the diplomats, but the Indian Government complained that it was still
vague and would require further elaboration "before the Chinese ceasefire
proposals can be fully considered." What China intended, of course, fell
short of what the Indians desired. The Indians wanted to restore the positions
they had held prior to September 18 and to resume the positions inside
the Chinese claim line in the west and north of the map-marked McMahon
Line in the Thag La area. It was not enough for the Chinese to withdraw
their troops. The Indians wanted all Chinese personnel to withdraw so that
the Indians would return to their forward positions.

A week after the ceasefire, Chou En-lai wrote to Nehru again and appealed
for Indian reciprocation of the Chinese measures. He urged that the Chinese
proposals had given "full consideration to the decency, dignity and self-respect
of both sides," and argued that their implementation would not involve
gain or loss of territory for either side. But he warned that Chinese withdrawal
could not by itself be expected to prevent clashes, and that Indian refusal
to cooperate would jeopardize the ceasefire. A sharply worded Chinese note
of December 8 accused India of "deliberate haggling and evading an answer."
Peking put three blunt questions: "Does the Indian Government agree, or
does it not agree, to a ceasefire? … Does the Indian Government agree,
or does it not agree, that the armed forces of the two sides should disengage
and withdraw each twenty kilometers from the November 7, 1959, line of
actual control? … Does the Indian Government agree, or does it not agree,
that officials of the two sides should meet…?" The Indian position to these
questions was: "Yes and No." For domestic and international effect, Nehru
and his colleagues were saying that the struggle with China would continue,
and that the deceitful Chinese proposals must be rejected. But in fact
the Indian Army was ordered to preserve the ceasefire and to avoid any
provocation to the Chinese. It had no intention of moving right up to the
McMahon Line again. The forward policy was dead, with the two or three
thousand Indian soldiers lost in the fighting, but the fundamental position
of the Indian Government had only been confirmed with no negotiations at
their stand. But as from the beginning, the Indian reputation for a pacific
approach was so high and the general opinion of China was so low that it
was not difficult for India to clock the unyielding and unchanging refusal
to negotiate and to shift the onus for preventing settlement to China.
The border war was almost universally reported as an unprovoked Chinese
invasion of India, which only confirmed the general impression that Peking
pursued a reckless, chauvinistic and belligerent foreign policy. The unilateral
Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal was explained as a Russian ultimatum that
brought it about, or that the U.S. had cleared its hands of the Cuba and
was about to intervene. Others accepted the popular Indian explanation
that the Chinese stop was "basically inspired by fear" because their lines
of communication were overstretched and they became vulnerable to Indian
counterattack. In time it was believed that, as Nehru put it, the Chinese
had turned tail rather than face "the unexpected anger of the Indian people
when aroused."

In the NEFA front, the ceasefire that came into effect at midnight on
November 21 was a formality. Although organized fighting had effectively
ended nearly forty-eight hours before, skirmishes continued in NEFA for
a week after the ceasefire. The ceasefire was more definitive in the western
sector than in the eastern sector. Survivors continued to emerge from the
foothills for several weeks. The trek was so arduous that many Indian troops
died from exposure or starvation on the way back. In 1965, the Defense
Ministry released the figures of Indian losses: 1,383 killed, 1,696 missing,
and 3,968 captured. Twenty-six of the Indians died of wounds in captivity,
and the remainders were repatriated. About ninety percent of the Indian
casualties were suffered in NEFA. The Indian Army later estimated that
the Chinese had used three divisions in the NEFA fighting; one normal and
one light division for the main thrust through Tawang, Se la and Bomdi
La to the foothills, and another division for the Walong action. The Indian
forces in NEFA numbered about twenty-five infantry battalions, equivalent
to just under three normal infantry divisions. So the Chinese probably
had only a narrow numerical superiority. But the Indian forces were so
scattered that Mao’s teaching could be easily put into effect: "In every
battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force … encircle the enemy forces
completely and strive to wipe them out thoroughly." Not one Chinese prisoner
was taken by the Indians.

The new Chief of Army Staff, Chaudhuri, proposed to transfer the displaced
Kaul to a training command in Punjab, but Kaul put in his resignation.
Nehru tried to dissuade him and then wrote him a letter: "The events which
have led to your retirement are sad and have distressed many of us. I am
sure, however, that you were not specially to blame for them. A large number
of people and perhaps just the circumstances were responsible for them."
Nehru suggested to Kaul later that he might be appointed lieutenant-governor
of Himachal Pradesh, but the idea was dropped, and the position was given
to Dr Teja, who was later indicted for fraud. General Thapar made Indian
Ambassador to Afghanistan. General Sen continued in East Command until
he resigned from the Army. General Prasad was reinstated in Western Command.
General Pathania resigned soon after the ceasefire. Brigadier Dalvi was
repatriated in May 1963, received two substantive promotions and commanded
a brigade in the 1965 war with Pakistan, and resigned in 1966 after superseded
in promotion to the rank of major-general. Krishna Menon stayed on the
Congress until being defeated twice in the 1967 general elections, but
returned to the Lok Sabha in 1969.

The Indians and to some extent people abroad held skepticism that China
would fulfill the proclaimed intention to withdraw behind the McMahon Line.
On November 30 the Chinese Defense Ministry in Peking announced of the
punctual withdraw to begin on December 1. The withdrawal was slow as the
Chinese had a lot of tidying up to do, and went about the task with meticulous
and even fussy care. They made it a matter of principle or pride to hand
back the equipment left by the retreating Indians in as good condition
as possible. It was collected, sacked, piled or parked; cleaned, polished,
and carefully inventoried – small arms, mortars, artillery, trucks, shells
and ammunition, clothing, and all the other impedimenta of a defeated army.
Among the return equipment were a few American automatic rifles as the
first installment of American military assistance captured at Se La, and
a Russian helicopter in serviceable condition. China did not publicize
this extraordinary transaction, and said it was simply a gesture "to further
demonstrate … sincerity for a peaceful settlement." But although Indians
cooperated by formally receiving the returned equipment, they bitterly
resented what they perceived as added humiliation and denounced the Chinese
gesture as a propaganda maneuver. The Indian Army did not return to NEFA
on the heels of the withdrawing Chinese. Civilians took over administration
and reached Tawang on January 21, 1963 and many months later the Indian
troops moved back into NEFA. New Delhi ignored the Chinese demand that
Indian troops be withdrawn twenty kilometers from the line of actual control
in the western and middle sectors, and Peking did not press that point.
But in the eastern sector, the Indians kept out of the territory between
Thag La ridge and the map-marked McMahon Line, and kept well back from
the Line.

After the ceasefire, the Afro-Asian countries showed marked inclination
to credit Peking for a genuine attempt to return the dispute to the negotiation
table. Now New Delhi felt the pressure to accept the Chinese ceasefire
proposal and resented it. The official spokesman explained at the end of
November: "Those who do not understand the full significance of the deceptive
Chinese proposals naturally ask why we cannot accept (them)." Nehru noted
with some exasperation that the non-aligned countries were failing to grasp
things that were obvious to India. However, President Nasser of the United
Arab Republic (UAR) gave no ground to Indian Government for complaint this
time. As he put forward a proposal to convene a conference to discuss the
ceasefire and possible bases of bilateral negotiation, the Indians found
him "one hundred per cent" behind them. On December 10, the Prime Minister
of Ceylon, Mrs. Bandaranaike, agreed to convene the conference in Colombo,
where six delegations met, including Ceylon, the UAR, Cambodia, Ghana,
Indonesia and Burma. The Governments concerned had previously been carefully
briefed by special ministerial missions from New Delhi as to the minimal
Indian requirement. It remained the restoration of the positions that Indians
obtained on September 8, which would permit the Indians to return to posts
set up in the western sector under the forward policy and to Dhola Post
in the east. Accordingly the UAR delegation in Colombo presented for full
restoration of the September 8^th position, but that was plainly
unacceptable to China. The Colombo powers proposed that the line of actual
control (i.e. the McMahon Line) could serve as the ceasefire line, ignoring
the Chinese stipulation that both sides keep armed forces twenty kilometers
back from the line.

In the western sector, the Colombo powers proposed that China should
carry out the twenty-kilometer withdrawal, but there should be no reciprocation
on the Indian side. Then, "pending a final solution of the border dispute,
the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawals will be demilitarized
zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon,
without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India
and China in that area." This passage permitted the return of Indians to
areas they had infiltrated under the forward policy, but it left ambiguous
point that the presence of Indian civilians across the line of actual control
in the western sector had "to be agreed upon" by China. When Mrs. Bandaranaike
went to New Delhi in January to submit the Colombo proposals, the Indians
persuaded her to allow them to remove the ambiguity. The Indian Ministry
of External Affairs released the "clarification" of the original passage,
by adding that "the number of posts and their composition that there has
to be an agreement between the two governments of India and China." For
once it seemed that Nehru and Chou En-lai both informed Mrs. Bandaranaike
to have accepted the proposals in principle. But Chou stated "two points
of interpretations" which were in fact reservations. As "clarified" by
the Indian Government, the proposals looked to China’s fulfilling most
of the provisions of her ceasefire declaration, but exempted India from
any obligations of reciprocity. Chou suggested that India military forces
should stay where they were in the east as in the west. He argued that
Indians should not be allowed back into the strip in the west where they
had infiltrated under the forward policy, either with troops or civilian
personnel. Peking maintained that to allow this would be "tantamount to
recognizing as legitimate the Indian armed invasion of this area and its
setting up of forty-three strong points there between 1959 and 1962." Instead,
Chou volunteered that China would pull all her posts out of that area,
civilian as well as military. Chou suggested that neither his "points of
interpretation" nor reservations on the Indian side should delay the opening
of talks. Such differences could be resolved in the talks themselves.

But the Indian Government was as resistant as ever to any kind of direct
exchanges with the Chinese. Nehru told the Lok Sabha: "We cannot have any
kind of talks, even preliminary talks, unless we are satisfied that the
condition we had laid down – about the 8^th September position
being restored – is met." Beneath the rhetoric of Opposition in Parliament
that pressed Nehru for clearer undertaking, the Indian approach was unchanged.
They were seeking a way to avoid meeting the Chinese without seeming to
rebuff the attempts of the Colombo powers. Peking’s reservations to the
Colombo proposals provided them the answer. The Indian Government promptly
declared that it accepted the Colombo proposals as clarified by themselves
"in toto," and declared that there could be no further step towards talks
or discussions until Peking had also accepted the proposals together with
the Indian clarifications in toto. Once again, skilful Indian diplomacy
had avoided negotiations by making physical concessions by China a precondition,
and shifted the onus of obstructing a meeting to China. In the International
Court at The Hague, Nehru’s reference strengthened the general impression
that it was India who was anxious to explore every avenue for peaceful
settlement, and China who was balking. Nehru’s stated: "I am prepared when
the time comes, provided there is approval of Parliament, even to refer
the basic dispute of the claims on the frontier to an international body…"
The foreign press reported this as a substantive Indian concession, ignoring
Nehru’s gloss latter on the remark. When members objected Nehru’s reference
to the International Court, Nehru immediately backed away: "What I said
was that if and when the time came of it, if the House agrees, if Parliament
agrees, we might perhaps think of it."

By this time it was plain that the Indian Government’s determination
not to negotiate for a settlement had only been confirmed by the defeat
on the borders. Chou En-lai wrote Nehru in April 1963, accusing him of
taking a dishonest approach and of having no intention whatever of holding
negotiations. He said that India exploited ambiguities in the Colombo proposals
to interpret those as conforming with the Indian demand for restoration
of the September 8^th positions, and was now trying to convert
them into an adjudication and force them on China. As for the reference
to the International Court, that was "plainly an attempt to cover up the
fact that the Indian Government refuse to negotiate." Chou reiterated China’s
readiness to open negotiations immediately on the basis of the Colombo
proposals, which both sides had accepted in principle. But, he went on,
"if the Indian Government, owing to its internal and external political
requirements, is not prepared to hold negotiations for the time being,
(China) is willing to wait with patience." A year later Nehru said in Parliament
that he would be willing to consider opening talks if the Chinese completely
evacuated the twenty-kilometer strip in the western sector. Chou En-lai
had proposed exactly that compromise, and when two emissaries of Bertrand
Russell put it to the Chinese Government, the Chinese did not rule it out.
New Delhi instantly denied that the Nehru entrusted the Russell emissaries
and said that only if the Chinese evacuated the western strip "the new
situation … might merit considerations." But by this time the Chinese Government
had decided that it was useless to open discussions on the borders with
India unless there was evidence of a radical change in Indian approach.
New Delhi continued to publish the diplomatic exchanges for years, and
the Indians continued to present themselves as the aggrieved party, and
the Chinese as aggressive and recalcitrant. On the ground the position
was reversed. There the boundaries had already been settled by China’s
crushing victory.

As the dust of battle subsided, most of the internationally conscious
class of Indians had to come to terms with a sad new world. That India
had preached the world to stopping the fighting in situations of dispute
was forgotten, and there was strong resentment towards the non-aligned
countries, "these amoral neutralists who have refused to give India the
unreserved sympathy and support she has asked for." The Soviet Union also
came in for a share of this displeasure. The U.S., Britain and other Western
powers stepped forward staunchly in the hour of India’s need, denouncing
China and offering India weapons and other assistance. America’s most active
efforts were increasingly in Asia against China. The Soviet Union had serious
split with China and soon also moved in the same direction as the U.S.
India’s falling-out with China fitted in with the emerging new pattern
of big-power relationships, with India moving towards a bi-alignment with
both Washington and Moscow against Peking. The substantial American military
assistance to India did not put off the Russians, who replied that they
understood the Indian needs and requests. In the immediate aftermath of
the border war, India appeared to be moving closer to the U.S. Nehru maintained
that non-alignment was alive and unimpaired, but in 1963 the Indian Foreign
Secretary expressed the Indian Government’s willingness "to work with the
United States both politically and militarily in the rest of Asia" for
the containment of China.

After receiving Nehru’s call for help, President Kennedy dispatched
Averell Harriman to India with a team of high-level State Department and
Pentagon advisers and General Paul Adams, commander of the mobile strike
force for emergency ground action. The Chinese announced their ceasefire
before Harriman and others left Washington, but unlike the aircraft carrier,
this mission did not turn back. After an eighteen-hour flight, the Americans
arrived on the evening of November 22, and found Nehru had constraint in
his attitude. One member of the mission wrote later: "His letters to Kennedy
asking for help had painted a desperate picture, but face to face Nehru
seemed to want to avoid talking about it all," and observed that "it must
have been difficult (for him) to greet Americans over the ruins of his
long-pursued policy of neutralism." The Harriman mission was paired with
one from Britain led by Duncan Sandys, and laid the groundwork for substantial
military assistance for India over the next three years. Later in 1963
a joint Anglo-American air exercise was held in India, with long-range
fighter aircraft flying in to operate from Indian Air force Bases. Nehru
had always explained his earlier resistance to acceptance of military aid,
as such dependence would reduce India’s independence.

Harriman’s mission hinted, "with exquisite delicacy," "at the need for
a settlement of the Kashmir dispute and for taking measures for joint defense
with Pakistan." But the "delicacy" soon disappeared, with Harriman and
Sandys launching all-out effort to use the promise of arms aid to lever
India into settlement with Pakistan. That meant compromise by India, involving
at least the surrender of a good part of the valley of Kashmir, and there
was never a chance that India would agree to that. The British and Americans
had been misled by a mirage effect of India’s mood of "nothing matters
but repelling the Chinese." Indians at all levels were saying that the
time had come to settle with Pakistan, but they meant to settle on the
status quo in Kashmir. To the Pakistanis, that was no settlement, but rather
a refusal to reach one. Harriman and Sandys pressed on, and a week after
their arrival, it was announced that Nehru and President Ayub of Pakistan
were to meet in an attempt to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The very next
day, Nehru assured an alarmed Parliament that his meeting with Ayub was
not "negotiations" but "talks." The Indo-Pakistan exchange broke down after
a series of fruitless preliminary meetings, when it became unmistakable
that the most India would concede fell unbridgeably short of the least
Pakistan would accept. American military aid continued until 1965 when
Pakistan attempted to shake Kashmir out of India’s grip by force that set
off their three-week war. India turned to the Soviet Union for assistance,
and thereafter Moscow became India’s biggest source of defense equipment.
Meanwhile, Pakistan moved into more cordial relations with Peking and began
receiving military equipment from China. The Indian role in international
affairs after the border war was never the same as before. The debacle
brutally exposed Indian weakness and its tacit alliance with the U.S. against
China, and India can no longer claim the role of leader of the non-aligned
countries. The 1960s were also the beginning of a period of mounting domestic
difficulties for India, further diminishing its international role.

The defeat from the border war was not so bitter, after all. The country
was united as never before and the Government was so confident that it
suspended the committee set up to promote national integration, arguing
that the war had done the work for it. The mythmakers were soon at work
on the defeat. A week after the ceasefire a journalist wrote: "The planned
withdrawal of several thousand Indian jawans (soldiers) and officers from
the besieged 14,000-ft Se La region in NEFA will surely be regarded by
future historians as a great page in military history." The official explanations
of the debacle were accepted, with the blame put on the Chinese rather
than on the Indian Government or the military leadership. It was suggested
that the Chinese had won because they fought in overwhelming numbers, without
regard for casualties, and took the defenders often by surprise. Much was
made of the climatic and logistical difficulties that faced the Indian
troops, and few asked why they had been made to engage the Chinese without
preparation in such adverse circumstances. The Army was instructed to conduct
an inquiry into the reverses in NEFA, but Major-General Brooks and Brigadier
Bhagat were ordered not to concern themselves with individual responsibilities
for the debacle. Furthermore, they were not allowed to question officers
in the General Staff or in other sections of Army H.Q., nor given access
to Army H.Q’s records. General Thapar declined to give a statement to the
board of inquiry, but offered to record his own comments on the report,
a procedure ruled as entirely improper. Kaul submitted two long statements,
but along with the report of Brigadier Dalvi, they were not passed on to
Brooks. The inquiry was almost closed, and the crucial exchanges between
the civilian leadership and Army H.Q. were undisclosed. The report followed
the NEFA fighting in detail, and the responsibility of Kaul, Sen and Thapar
was made clear although the blame was left tacit. The report could have
been but most damaging to Nehru and the Government, and therefore it was
classified and kept top secret. Defense Minister, Chavan, merely made a
statement to Parliament: "We should never … say or do things which could
only give heart to the enemy and demoralize our own men." Chavan explained
the "series of reverses" from the Namka Chu to Bomdi La: "These battles
were fought on our remotest borders and were at heights not known to the
Army and at places which geographically had all the disadvantages for our
troops and many advantages to the enemy."

Nehru made no gesture towards resignation, and he and his Government
thus survived the disaster, which would surely have overturned any other
democratic Cabinet. But Nehru’s old moral and political domination in Parliament
and the Congress Party was gone, not to be recovered in his remaining eighteen
months of life. The inner balance of power in New Delhi shifted with uncertainty
and indecision as Nehru remained to be the Prime Minister. Before the border
fighting, when Nehru was in his prime, it might be said that India had
a dictator who would not establish a dictatorship. One area of decisive
and determined change in the Indian Government was that of defense. In
the next two years, India’s defense expenditure was more than doubled.
The latest available American and British supplies replaced the obsolete
equipment and stores. The political position of the Army was sharply changed,
almost reversed by the debacle. There would be no more interference by
the civilians in internal Army matter. In a letter to Bertrand Russell
in December, Nehru referred to "the danger of the military mentality spreading
in India, and the power of the Army increasing." In broader political terms,
a marked shift to the Right appeared as a consequence of the border war,
which exposed the intrinsic shallowness and weakness of the Indian Left
as a national political force. The Left leadership, represented by Kerala
and West Bengal, showed avowed sympathy for Peking and refused to denounce
China for aggression, and as a result lost popularity. But the influence
of the Sino-India dispute on the political balance was far from racial
in India, and probably did no more than accelerating trends already in
progress.

One of the most marked and saddest consequences of the border was perhaps
the personal and political decline of Nehru. Menon said later in 1962:
"I think he collapsed; it demoralized him completely because everything
he had built up in his life was going." The remaining youthfulness was
stricken from his shoulders, and he was left stooped and unsteady, cherishing
a bitter sense of injury against the Chinese, whom he felt had betrayed
him and all he had striven for. Much less was heard in India about forcing
the Chinese "to vacate their aggression," although in 1970 the opposition
Congress tried to commit the Government to doing just that. The forward
policy was not revived. The Army build up its strength in Ladakh and opened
roads to its forward positions, but they remained outside the Chinese claim
line and the dispositions were defensive. The overall superiority in numbers
of the Chinese Army and their advantages in movement on the Tibetan plateau
make it likely that the Indians can never hope to mount a successful offensive
action anywhere on the northern borders, so long as China’s central power
is unbroken. As the borders settled into an armed truce, diplomatic relations
between China and India were also frozen. Nehru resisted the pressure to
break off the diplomatic relations with Peking, but closed the Chinese
consulate in Bombay. It was a concession to domestic opinion, but it cost
India its consulate in Lhasa, a loss which must have made Lord Curzon turn
in his grave. It was years before anyone in India was bold enough to suggest
mending relations with China. In 1969, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi, then Prime
Minister, made the suggestion, she was criticized in Parliament. The Chinese
showed no interest in improving relations with India. Chinese maps continue
to ignore the McMahon Line. Presumably Peking’s long-standing offer to
negotiate a boundary settlement on the basis of the status quo when India
is ready to do so still stands. But thus to go back to the beginning would
mean India’s tacit admission of error, and recantation of the deeply cherished
belief that in 1962 she was the innocent victim of unprovoked Chinese aggression.
That will never be easy.

AlexHu. 1999.

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